Reconstructing an episode in the history of philosophy: arthāpatti in Kumārila's commentators[*]

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1 Introduction

Arthāpatti is, according to Mīmāṃsā authors, a distinct instrument of knowledge, leading one to know out of a given set of facts that something else needs to be the case. The standard examples of it are "Caitra, who is known to be alive, is not home", leading to "Caitra is outside" and "The fat Devadatta does not eat at day time", leading to "Devadatta eats at night". Mīmāṃsā authors contend, against Naiyāyika ones, that the arthāpatti is distinct from and cannot be reduced to inference. Bhāṭṭa authors add a distinction between dṛṣṭa- and śrutārthāpatti. In the first case, one postulates a state of affairs that appeases the seeming impossibility created by the clash among two conflicting pieces of knowledge (in the example, Caitra's being alive and his not being in his habitual place). In the second case, one postulates a linguistic expression in order to appease the seeming impossibility created by a (logically incomplete) sentence (such as, in the example above "The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime", which requires to be completed by the words "He eats at night"). Freschi forthcoming(a) reconstructs the early history of arthāpatti, pointing out the presence of (at least) two distinct currents in Mīmāṃsā, a hermeneutical one focusing on the exegesis of the Veda and an epistemological one focusing more on the philosophical arena were Nyāya authors and Buddhists of the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti school were debating logical and epistemological issues. Kumārila is the champion of this second current.

     The present article attempts to reconstruct the history of the discussion on arthāpatti among the three main commentators on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* (henceforth ŚV), namely Uṃveka, Sucarita and Pārthasārathi Miśra.[1] It shows how distant their position can be at times and does justice to their role as autonomous philosophers.

2 Methodology

At times the small community of Sanskrit scholars has been made less cohesive by an opposition between a so-called philological and a so-called theoretical approach. The former would focus on critical editions of texts as the only possible starting point for each investigation, the latter would consider editions little more than an antiquarian curiosity and claim that what one needed to do with

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[1]Unless explicitly signalled, I will quote Kumārila's text as it is found in Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K.Kunjunni Raja, and Thangaswamy 1971.

texts was way more interesting than reconstructing variants, namely looking at what theoretical tools Sanskrit texts can offer, especially to contemporary discussions. The weaknesses of both views are easily seen. On the one hand, theories based on poorly published texts or on their paraphrases have weak to non-existent bases and are likely to miss the most important innovations of Sanskrit texts, the ones one needs to engage with the text to discover, since they are unexpected and do not fit in a ready-made scheme. In fact, a poorly edited text is likely to overlook or even obliterate exactly these unexpected invocations. On the other hand, critical editions are not works of mathematics and need historical acumen. As discussed elsewhere (Freschi and Keidan 2017), one cannot edit a text without understanding it and one cannot understand a specialist text without understanding (at least in part) its specific topic. A person whose mother tongue is English and who has studied 18th c. calligraphy will still not be in the best position to understand and edit an unpublished English manuscript about astronomy, if she does not know anything about astronomy. She will be inclined to read unknown words as if they were familiar ones and to interpret sentences (e.g., by adding punctuation) in a way which makes sense to her, but might be completely wrong.

As a historically trained European scholar, I am convinced that the opposition sketched above needs to be superseded through a focus on the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. In order to reconstruct it, one needs to locate texts in a given context and to be aware of their contents. When it comes to philosophical texts, one needs to understand them taking seriously their philosophical content. In other words, in order to be a good philologist, I am convinced that one needs to be a good historian of philosophy, which, in turn, requires being able to philosophically understand the arguments made by a given text.[2]

The present article is an attempt to use the point of view of the history of philosophy to reconstruct a debate, the one about arthāpatti, in a relatively short span of time (8th to 11th c.) within the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

It will be shown that the debate has specific protagonists, whose distinct personalities emerge even in the case of such a specific topic. Indian philosophy is too often neglected in the European and Anglophone discourse and one of the reasons for this neglect could be the fact that it seems to be lacking great thinkers. Outsiders look in vain for the "Indian Aristotle" and then decide that Indian philosophy is a traditionalist philosophy with no space for original contributions. In fact, insiders know well enough that this prejudice is akin to the one of those who think that "All Italians (or Chinese or Ethiopians…) look alike". They do not really look alike, but one fails to detect their distinct traits because one is too used to recognise only the distinctive traits of people looking like oneself. In this sense, studies elaborating on the personality of single philosophers might be an important contribution for overcoming the neglect of

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[2]This is, by the way, the approach Raffaele Torella implicitly taught his students. While critically editing texts he was deeply interested in and taking into account their broader context (whom where they answering to? who quoted them and why?…). It took me years to be able to spell out all the good practices I was imbibed in since my beginnings in Sanskrit studies.

(much of) Indian philosophy.[3]

3 History and chronology

3.1 Chronology of the Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākara divide

The section on arthāpatti in Kumārila's ŚV is relatively short, as it comprises 88 verses. The first 50 are dedicated to arthāpatti in general, i.e., dṛṣṭārthāpatti. Verses from 51 to 88 focus on śrutārthāpatti.

This section of the ŚV has been commented upon first by Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa (in his *Ślokavārttikavyākhyatātpāryaṭīkā*, henceforth ŚVVTṬ)[4] then most probably by Sucarita (in his *Kāśikā*, also referred to as *Prakāśikā*) and last by Pārthasārathi (in the *Nyāyaratnākara*).

Although this article focuses on the perspective of Kumārila's school on arthāpatti, it will be unavoidable to mention its main interlocutor, namely the Prābhākara school. Prabhākara dealt with arthāpatti in a short section of his Bṛhatī commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya, whereas Śālikanātha dealt with the topic in much more detail in his subcommentary on the Bṛhatī (called Ṛjuvimalā) as well as in his autonomous treatise on epistemology, the Pramāṇaparāyaṇa (included in the Prakaraṇapañcikā, henceforth PrP).

The relative chronology of Kumārila and Prabhākara is still debated, but K. Yoshimizu's arguments about the former being an older contemporary of the latter (Yoshimizu 1997) seem hard to overcome. In the context of arthāpatti, this hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the fact that the arthāpatti section of the ŚV lacks any explicit awareness (for an implicit hint, see Uṃveka on v. 77, discussed below) of the Prābhākara position on arthāpatti, although this is very distinctive. By contrast, post-Śālikanātha Mīmāṃsā authors will spill much ink on especially two topics:

1. Prābhākara authors departing with Śālikanātha state that the *gamaka* 'trigger' in an arthāpatti is liable to be doubted. In the standard example, one is not completely sure whether Caitra is still alive, given that he is not found in his usual place. The doubt is appeased by the postulation of his being outside. Later Bhāṭṭa authors state that this cannot be the case, since this doubt would endanger the validity of arthāpatti as an instrument of knowledge.

2. Prabhākara himself and all Prābhākara authors refute the distinction between a dṛṣṭa and a śruta type of arthāpatti. They maintain that even in

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[3]Once again, let me mention that this is what Raffaele Torella did, e.g., in the case of the workshop on Utpaladeva and the ensuing proceedings (Torella and Bäumer 2016): They show Utpaladeva's personality as well distinct from the one of Abhinavagupta. The same applies to his recovery of Vāmanadatta's original elaboration of a Vaiṣṇava monism (see Torella 1994 and Torella 2016). On the pros and cons of applying contextualism as a way to detect the distinct voice of an author, see Ganeri 2008.

[4]The portion of the ŚVVTṬ on *arthāpatti* is unfortunately not completely extant, as it lacks the part commenting on vv. 4–21).

the cases treated as śrutārthāpatti by Bhāṭṭa authors, what appeases the seeming impossibility and solves the seeming clash of cognitions is a state of affairs, not its linguistic enunciation.

Why was Kumārila not aware of any pre-Prabhākara Prābhākarian position, as it is the case in the chapter on linguistic communication? And why do his commentators not mention *Prabhākara's* distinct position on arthāpatti? Possibly because of three reasons:

- Unlike in other cases, in this case there was no elaborated Prābhākara-like position on arthāpatti before Prabhākara. Kumārila systematised his school lore on arthāpatti by doing what he deemed to be right, namely strengthening the criteria for its being an instrument of knowledge.

- Prabhākara's position itself on the topic was far from clear.[5]

- The real hero of the Prābhākara position on arthāpatti, namely Śālikanātha, was yet to come.

The terms of the Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākara debate on arthāpatti may have indeed been set by Prabhākara's commentator, Śālikanātha, who is in general the main responsible for the reception of Prabhākara's thought and is in fact the real inventor of what became to be known as the Prābhākara position on arthāpatti.

Nonetheless, a forerunner of a Prābhākara argument can be found in Umveka's commentary on v. 77. This contains the argument against the need to postulate a linguistic expression in order to appease the impossibility raised by sentences such as "The fat Devadatta does not eat at day time". The proposed solution is to just postulate the *fact* of eating at night, not the corresponding sentence:

> The negation of eating at day time for one who is fat is impossible without [his] eating at night, since fatness is the result of eating and once [eating] is negated at day time, one apprehends exactly its presence at another time, one does not apprehend the sentence about eating at night. That alone, however, is apprehended by means of arthāpatti and made present to one's thought. It is not the case that the comprehension of the sentence meaning is known through arthāpatti, because there is no evidence for the fact that one apprehends the sentence about eating at night before apprehending the eating at night.[6]

This position might be traced back to the opponent staged by Kumārila on v. 77ab, who states:

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[5]Prabhākara's position on arthāpatti, as opposed to Śālikanātha's one, is reconstructed in Freschi forthcoming(a).

[6]pīnasya divābhojanapratiṣedho rātribhojanaṃ vinā nopapadyate, bhojanakāryatvāt pīnatvasya divāniṣedhena tasyaivānyatra sadbhāvaḥ pratīyate, na rātrivākyasya. sa eva tv arthāpattyā pratipannas tadbuddhau saṃnidhāpayati, nārthāpattipramitā vākyārthāvagatiḥ; rātribhojanapratīteḥ pūrvaṃ rātrivākyapratipattau pramāṇābhāvāt.

> Why is not the *meaning* postulated that this (fatness) cannot exist without that (eating at night) [instead of postulating the corresponding sentence]? |[7]

Thus, one can imagine that, though not aware of Prabhākara's positions, Uṃveka and possibly Kumārila himself (as discussed in Freschi forthcoming(a)) knew he was innovating at least insofar as he was postulating a specific distinct śrutārthāpatti.

Another conundrum regards the relative chronology of the first commentator of Kumārila, Uṃveka (8th c.?) and the first commentator on Prabhākara, Śālikanātha (8th c.?), since it is unsure whether one knew the other (a tentative reason for the sequence just stated is offered in section 4.4). They are both original philosophers, but no direct reuse of their wording could be detected, neither in their respective works, nor in the work of another quasi-Mīmāṃsā author who lived after Kumārila (and most probably after Uṃveka but at the same time as Śālikanātha), namely Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.[8] In the case of Sucarita and Pārthasārathi, they clearly come after both Uṃveka and Śālikanātha and most probably in this sequence (see, for the relative chronology of all these authors, Kataoka 2011).

3.2   Commentators vis-à-vis Kumārila

As it is customary according to the Sanskrit scholarly etiquette, commentators tend to overall agree with each other, but with some important exceptions, most notably within the śrutārthāpatti section. They also all tend to agree with Kumārila's text (albeit offering at times distinct and incompatible interpretations of it). The only exception in this sense is v. 78 ab, where Kumārila appears to say that one needs to postulate a linguistic expression (and not just the state of affairs it would convey) in the case of śrutārthāpatti, "because conceptual cognitions apprehend first a linguistic expression" (savikalpakavijñānaiḥ śabdaḥ pūrvaṃ pratīyate). This sort of admission of the primacy of language within conceptual cognitions seems to clash with Kumārila's usual attitude, as it risks to take side with Bhartṛhari on the omni-pervasiveness of language. Thus, all commentators try to find different solutions and attribute this half verse to a prima facie view to be abandoned, though not stating explicitly that they are in disagreement with Kumārila.

The following sections will follow the commentators one by one and then all together on some issues of specific relevance. In both cases, I hope to be able to convey their individual profile and distinct contribution.

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[7]etadarthād vinā nāyam ity arthaḥ kiṃ na kalpyate |

[8]On the chronology of Jayanta and Śālikanātha see Graheli forthcoming and especially Saxena forthcoming.

4 Uṃveka

Umveka (also known as Umbeka)[9] likely lived in the early eighth century CE. He must have lived after Kumārila and Maṇḍana, whose works he comments upon, and before Kamalaśīla, who in his commentary (*pañjikā*) to Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* refers to him as Ubeyaka and paraphrases a passage of his ŚVVTṬ.[10] The date of Kamalaśīla can be better fixed on the basis of Chinese sources (see Introduction to GOS edition) to the latter half of the 8th c. CE. His commentary survives in a single manuscript (edited by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri in 1971), which is only complete up to the end of the vana section of Kumārila's ŚV, and is also missing a few folios in other sections. Uṃveka also wrote a commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Bhāvanāviveka*, a work about Mīmāṃsā's philosophy of action. Nothing else is known about him.[11]

4.1 Agenda

Uṃveka was a philosopher on his own right, as proven by his commentary on the ŚV, by the one on the *Bhāvanāviveka*, and by his fortune also outside Mīmāṃsā (from Kamalaśīla to Jayanta[12]).

He is clearly an upholder of Kumārila's epistemological stance against the hermeneutical approach to arthāpatti (see 1). This is particularly evident when it comes to śrutārthāpatti, which is the one more directly relevant for the hermeneutical purposes of Mīmāṃsā authors. For instance, in his commentary on v. 77, Uṃveka is the only commentator to point out again that the whole reflection on śrutārthāpatti regards primarily worldly examples such as "The fat Devadatta does not eat at day time" and not Vedic ones. When he does introduce a connection to Vedic exegesis, as in his commentary on v. 62, he does it while using a vocabulary that can be acceptable for both exegetical and epistemological purposes and speaks therefore of *liṅga* 'sign' and *pramāṇa* 'instrument of knowledge' (two terms which play an exegetical as well as an epistemological role).

Uṃveka is also the commentator who is most aware of Kumārila's overall project, so that he uses the arthāpatti section also in order to reinforce Kumārila's theory of the intrinsic validity of cognitions, his anti-reductionism (i.e., his overall goal to refute the attempts to reduce other instruments of knowledge to inference) and his understanding of the way language communicates meanings. For instance, in his commentary on v. 12 he dedicates time and

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[9]Both names are attested. I favour the first version since it seems easier that Umbeka developed as an easier reading of the odd Uṃveka, rather than the other way round.

[10]See Krishnamacharya 1926, p. 812. The relevant passage by Kamalaśīla is also reproduced in the Preface to Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K.Kunjunni Raja, and Thangaswamy 1971.

[11]Some scholars have maintained, on the basis of a colophon in a manuscript of Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*, that Uṃveka was identical to the playwright Bhavabhūti (as V.V. Mirashi 1974 argued in his monograph on the playwright). For this and further suggested identifications, see also the Preface in Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K.Kunjunni Raja, and Thangaswamy 1971.

[12]An incomplete list of the Buddhist and Vedāntic authors who reused him can be read in the Preface on Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K.Kunjunni Raja, and Thangaswamy 1971.

energy to the failure of the formal reduction of arthāpatti to inference, spelling out what could be the locus or the probans and why no option for it works.

4.2 Theory of arthāpatti

Umveka offers a short and precise definition of arthāpatti at the end of his introduction:

> Something understood which does not make sense otherwise, causes one to postulate something else, so that the first thing makes sense in precisely the way that it was cognised in the first place.[13]

That is, unlike in the case of one's understanding that one's touching the tip of the Tour Eiffel (or, in its Indian instantiation, bearing an elephant's herd on the tip of one's finger) was just an illusion, **in the case of arthāpatti a later cognition shows that the initial one was indeed true, although it seemed to entail an inconsistency with one's background knowledge**.

In his commentary on v. 25, he sums up his account for the impossibility of reductionism: like Kumārila, he also points out that arthāpatti does not have the structure of inference. The probans of the alleged inference cannot be the sheer absence from home, because if one were to say that "Caitra is outside, because he is not home", there would be overextension to cases such as Caitra's being dead. Nor can the probans be the sheer absence from home qualified by someone's being alive (as in "Caitra is outside, because of someone's being not home while being alive"), since this could lead us to infer that Yajñadatta, not Caitra, is alive somewhere else. Thus, the only viable probans would the absence from home of the specific person Caitra who is alive. But at that point, Caitra's being alive would *presuppose* his being outside (since it would be otherwise impossible) and not be its probans.[14]

The same tenet is elaborated in the commentary on v. 30, where Umveka repeats that there is indeed an invariable concomitance between the trigger of the arthāpatti and the thing it causes to know (e.g., between the absence from home and the being outside).[15] The difference between arthāpatti and inference lies in the fact that the invariable concomitance is not epistemically at disposal for the cogniser before they undertake the arthāpatti. In this sense, it is quite clear that Umveka's arthāpatti is not at all an instrument to the best explanation (pace Siderits forthcoming). Rather, arthāpatti is as certain as cognitions can be according to Mīmāṃsā. What distinguishes it from inference is

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[13]avagato 'nyathānupapadyamānaś ca yathaivāvagatas tathaivopapadyamāno yad arthāntaraṃ kalpayati.

[14]jīvata eva caitrasyaivābhāvaś caitrasya bahirbhāvaṃ sādhayati, anyataraviśeṣaṇāpāye tu na. […] na caitramātreṇa viśeṣitaṃ gamayati, mṛte 'pi bhāvāt. nāpi jīvanamātreṇa, caitra-bahirbhāvābhāve 'pi devadattabahirbhāve sadbhāvād ity arthaḥ. ubhayaviśeṣitasya tu gṛhābhāvasya bahirbhāvasādhakatvam, tasya copapattir bahirbhāvāvagatipūrviketi na tadavagatau tasya liṅgatvam.

[15]nanv atrāpi gṛhābhāvasya bahirbhāvena niyatatvād avinābhāvenaiva pratipatter anumānatvam evety āśaṅkyāha **avinābhāvitā cātreti**. saty apy atrāvinābhāvitve gṛhītāvinābhāvasyaiva pratipādakatvena nānumānatvam ity arthaḥ.

the fact that the cogniser is not aware of the invariable concomitance beforehand. Why is it not known beforehand in the case of Caitra's absence from home, whereas it can be known in the canonical Indian case of inference, i.e., fire and smoke? In his commentary on v. 42, he explains that in the case of fire and smoke their invariable concomitance has been repeatedly observed and that it was possible to grasp them completely and to notice their absence from *vipakṣa*s ' dissimilar instances':

> It is correct that the concomitance is grasped because one has repeatedly observed that there is the universal smoke together with the universal fire. For, both [universals] can be grasped entirely in a single place and one does not grasp them in dissimilar instances (e.g., in a lake).[16]

The mention of universals seems to imply that the point is the fact that universals are clearly implied in the case of inferences, whereas they are not in the case of arthāpatti, possibly because arthāpatti regards individuals qua individuals.[17]

As for the śrutārthāpatti section, Uṃveka assumes a distinct position in his commentary on v. 78. There, he is the only one among commentators mentioning the issue of *bhāvanā* as an evidence for the need of śrutārthāpatti. He explains that linguistic expressions have a specific way of operating, namely insofar as they cause into being (bhāvanā) an action. And this causing into being requires specific complements, such as a person being caused to act and a goal to be achieved. This requires that one postulates also these elements in their linguistic form. The link with bhāvanā is suggested as alternative explanation for the need of a distinct śrutārthāpatti once Uṃveka (like all other commentators) has refuted Kumārila's own proposal put forth in v. 78a, namely the reference to the linguistic nature of all conceptual cognitions, as this would contradict Kumārila's subject- and language-independent direct realism. This could be easily read as a confirmation of Uṃveka's complete grasp and endorsement of Kumārila's overall project with the ŚV. Perhaps this is also what the title of his commentary (literally 'Gloss on the purport [of the ŚV], which is a commentary on the ŚV') aims at conveying?

4.3 Style

Uṃveka's commentary is at times extremely synthetic; it is clear that its author does not feel compelled to explain Kumārila's verses in all their details (as, on the contrary, Pārthasārathi does). Moreover, Uṃveka appears at times to favour a dense style in which complicated compounds have a privileged place even when they are not essential. For instance, in his commentary on v. 82 he speaks of how the relation between sense faculty and object cannot be one of "adequacy" (*yogyatā*) because the adequacy of the sense faculty for its object

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[16]yuktaṃ dhūmatvasyāgnitvena saha bhūyodarśanena sahacāritvagrahaṇam. tayor ubhayor apy ekasmin pradeśe kṛtsnopalabdheḥ, vipakṣe ca darśanābhāvāt.

[17]On the difference between arthāpatti and inference (*anumāna*) being the presence of universal quantificators in the latter only, see Yoshimizu forthcoming.

is understood only *after* having apprehended the object and adds what follows: "The adequacy is understood at a time successive to the apprehension of the result which is characterised as the apprehension of the visible quality" (rūpa-pratipattilakṣaṇakāryapratipattyuttarakālaṃ ca yogyatāvagamyamānā). Similarly, Uṃveka appears to have had a predilection for rare words, like romaśā for 'bush' in the commentary on verse 34.

More technically, Umbeka alone of Kumārila's commentators uses the verb *pary-ava-sthā-*, or *pary-upa-sthā-*, to refer to the role that a cognition has in "setting up" another cognition, which is precisely what happens in the case of *arthāpatti* (see his commentary to verse 54, 62, and 72). For instance:

> The sentence about [Devadatta's eating] at night is not known, to begin with, through sense perception, nor through inference, nor through a postulated sentence (different than "The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime"). If it (postulated sentence) could communicate without having a relation (with the only thing we have, namely the heard sentence), then it would communicate without a relation since there is no inferential mark (it could be based on). It is therefore better that the heard sentence is the instrument for knowing (about Devadatta's eating at night), because it is that (heard sentence) which sets up (upasthāpaka) the arthāpatti.[18]

This use is particularly interesting, because Śālikanātha uses the same verb as well, although with less technical a meaning, namely in order to refer to both the way a cognition leads to a further one and directly to a content (*artha*). What does this tell us about the relative chronology of Uṃveka and Śālikanātha?

4.4   Relation to the other commentators

Uṃveka's dense style might explain at least in part why Sucarita and Pārthasārathi never reuse literally Uṃveka's comments, although at times they appear to have been influenced by their contents.

As for Śālikanātha, no specific reuse of his words could be identified, but there are several possible echoes. Since Uṃveka does not at all engage with the idea of doubt in the process of arthāpatti (whereas Sucarita needs to examine it thoroughly), it is more likely that Uṃveka predates Śālikanātha.

5   Sucarita

The possibly second commentary on the ŚV is called *Kāśikā*, or sometimes *Prakāśikā*. The title could refer simply to a commentary that "casts light"

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[18]evaṃ tāvan na rātrivākyasya pratyakṣatvaṃ nānumeyatvaṃ nāpi kalpyāgamaprameyatvam, kalpyasyāpi sambandhagrahaṇābhāvena tatpratipattau liṅgatvābhāvāt sambandhagrahaṇābhāvena ca pratipādakatve varaṃ śrūyamāṇasyaivārthāpattiparyupasthāpakatvena pramāṇatvam (ad v. 72).

(prakāś-) on Kumārila's text, or it could refer to a commentary that was composed in the city of Kāśī, or Vārāṇasī. Sucaritamiśra probably lived in the middle of the tenth century.[19] His *Kāśikā* has been partly published on the basis of one manuscript only.[20]

5.1 Agenda and contribution

Sucarita is clearly an independent thinker, who tries to make sense of Kumārila's text without feeling compelled to be limited by the content of the text itself. For instance, as will be discussed below (section 6), Sucarita dares offering three different ways to formalise the absence from home as a quality of the locus (*pakṣadharma*) in his commentary on v. 10; and he distinguishes two working processes for arthāpatti in the commentary on v. 46. This does not appear to be done in a polemical way, as Sucarita is always careful (like Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi) not to explicitly contradict Kumārila. He just goes on in his philosophical way, respecting Kumārila, but feeling more attracted by the argument and by what it needs to make it as compelling as possible.

In the arthāpatti section (but the same impression can be gathered by looking at his commentary on other sections, e.g., the vākyādhikaraṇa one[21]), Sucarita is the only commentator who deeply engages with Prābhākara ideas. In the case of arthāpatti this means that he deals extensively (in the introduction to the whole section, in connection with v. 24, in his commentary on v. 29) with the problem of whether the being alive of Caitra in the standard example ("Caitra, who is alive, is not at home, therefore he is outside") is ever *doubted*. Prābhākara authors after Śālikanātha do in fact think that, by seeing that Caitra is not home, his being still alive is doubted, until one realises that there is an alternative solution, namely his being outside. Sucarita insists that this solution is rather provoked by the conflict between two contradicting pieces of information, namely his being alive and his being not at home, which need to be both *niścita* 'ascertained', since no doubtful piece of information can ever lead one to conclude anything, as in what later became the standard reply to the Prābhākara position (see Nārāyaṇa's *Mānameyodaya* and Cidānanda's *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*).

However, Sucarita also admits that arthāpatti is characterised by a conflict between cognitions, which provokes a further investigation finally leading to the ascertainment of Caitra's being out of his home. The interesting point in this connection is the fact that this further investigation is called *vitarka*, a term which can also be translated with doubt, as it denotes some openness in one's investigation, so that one notices how Sucarita's positions seems to come closer to Śālikanātha's. A similar point is repeated in his commentary on v.

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[19]See the timeline of Kataoka 2011, p. 112.

[20]Recently, Taisei Shida and Shishir Saxena have undertaken critical editions of further parts of the Kāśikā, on the basis of two (Saxena) or seven (Shida) manuscripts. For a survey of the Kāśikā's manuscripts, see Shida 2013.

[21]For a comparison of Sucarita and Śālikanātha's positions on sentence meaning, see Saxena 2018.

76 on śrutārthāpatti, where Sucarita restates that there must be a stall due to the mutual contradiction (*parasparapratighāta*) of two pieces of information, possibly even of two sources of knowledge, given that he says that the fatness in "The fat one does not eat at day-time" is known through sense-perception. This fits, by the way, with the reading of v. 29 found in text of the ŚV as represented in Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K.Kunjunni Raja, and Thangaswamy 1971 and presupposed by Pārthasārathi, according to which arthāpatti is said to be 'the one which entails a contradiction' (*pratighātin*).[22]

Sucarita is also the only one distinguishing among two working procedures within arthāpatti (in his commentary on v. 46). In one case, arthāpatti is triggered by the fact that two contradictory inferences could take place, and it defeats the wrong one. To elaborate, the two contradictory inferences would be: 1. Caitra is absent from home, because he is present in another place, e.g., the flowerbed in front of me; 2. Caitra is present at home, because he is absent from another place, e.g., the patch beside the flowerbed. In the other case, arthāpatti is triggered by the presence of two sets of evidences of equal force and it postulates something extra by means of which both sets of evidences are made to make sense.

A further contribution to the topic of arthāpatti consists in Sucarita's linguistic interpretation of śrutārthāpatti. Already in his commentary on v. 29, Sucarita introduces the term *apekṣā* 'requirement' in connection with what is needed in order to make sense of two initial contradictory statements at the beginning of an arthāpatti reasoning. Within the śrutārthāpatti section he elaborates on it and appears to consider *apekṣā* in the context of śrutārthāpatti as tantamount to *ākāṅkṣā* 'syntactical expectation'. The latter is the syntactical link connecting, typically, a verb and its complements, e.g., "cow" and "Bring!", and is considered by Mīmāṃsā authors as one of the three distinctive marks of a sentence (see Freschi forthcoming(b)). Sucarita suggests that in śrutārthāpatti the feeling of incompleteness the listener experiences is tantamount to what they experience while listening to a sentence and before its completion. For instance, in the commentary on v. 77, an opponent suggests to appease the incongruity lying at the basis of a śrutārthāpatti (e.g., the one between someone's fatness and the fact that it is said that he does not eat at daytime) through a fact (his eating at night), rather than through a sentence ("He eats at night"). The point is well put and one can easily imagine that seeing a fat man —about whom one has heard that he does not eat at day time— eating at night would appease one's sense of puzzlement. Sucarita, however, replies by sharply interpreting the example in purely linguistic terms, and bringing in the concept of *ākāṅkṣā*. He does not yet spell out a further consequence of the introduction of *ākāṅkṣā* in the debate, namely that śrutārthāpatti represents also the cognition through which we grasp the linguistic expression "Close!" once the syntagma "the door" has been heard, but the way for this conclusion has been paved.[23]

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[22]The whole verse reads anyathānupapattau tu prameyānupraveśitā | tādrūpyeṇaiva vijñānān na doṣaḥ pratighātinaḥ || The ŚV text embedded in Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī 1926-9 reads the last pāda as follows: na doṣaḥ pratibhāti naḥ.

[23]The example of "Close!" being known through arthāpatti once "the door" has been heard

Last, Sucarita's contribution to the arthāpatti's debate also consists in his focus on hermeneutics. Like, again, Prābhākara scholars, Sucarita is very much aware of the premises and consequences of the refutation of śrutārthāpatti for the hermeneutics of Vedic texts and spells them out at length, especially at the end of his commentary on the section. It appears clearly that Sucarita, unlike Kumārila and, to a less extent, Uṃveka, is not shy in letting Mīmāṃsā topics enter the discussion, especially in the case of śrutārthāpatti. For instance, in the discussion about v. 78, he clearly states that one needs to postulate a linguistic expression, and not just the corresponding state of affairs, by evoking the case of mantras which need to be adapted to a new context. In their case, the expectation regards a new linguistic expression, not just its meaning.

Sucarita is also the first one introducing another idea which appears to be extraneous to Kumārila's arthāpatti section, namely the reference to people's subjective experience of epistemology (something which could be said to be akin to a socio-anthropology or to a psychology of epistemology). This has a role in his commentary on v. 18, where it is said that the proposed explanation does not correspond to the epistemological experience of common people (*laukika*) and even more clearly in his commentary on v. 29, which contains an explicit defence of the distinct nature of arthāpatti based on the consensus of both experts and normal people. Similarly, in his commentary on vv. 31–33 and 35 he refers to the way "all" people cognise. Part of this attention to the anthropology of epistemology is also Sucarita's reference (in the commentary on v. 78, but also on ŚV pratyakṣa 171) to animals and to the way they know. Interested readers can thus know that according to Sucarita animals regularly apply instruments of knowledge, including sense perception (and possibly inference and arthāpatti), although they cannot apply the śruta- type, since they do not use language. The seminal idea of Sucarita's discussion about animals is found already in Śālikanātha, who mentions the case of animals as an evidence of the fact that there must be non-linguistic conceptual cognitions (and therefore there is no need to postulate a linguistic expression even in the case of arthāpattis leading one to a conceptual content). Śālikanātha quotes in this regard a group of verses which he attributes to the Vārttikakāra and which already contain the word *tiryañc* 'animal'. The Vārttikakāra is most probably Kumārila and the verses might come therefore from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, which could, hence, have been Sucarita's direct source. The verses state that animals also understand *agni* ('fire') as an *artha*, although not as a linguistic expression. Accordingly, animals don't have śrutārthāpatti because they lack language. Nothing is said about their further abilities.

Further, Sucarita enlarges the scope of the discussion by referring to broader problems such as the polemics with the Buddhist thinkers of the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti school who uphold *parataḥ prāmāṇya* 'extrinsic validity' (most

notably in his commentary on v. 40). Also noteworthy is Sucarita's choice to justify the Mīmāṃsā account of inference through an ontological argument, namely the idea that a sound *vyāpti* 'invariable concomitance' must be tested in a different place (so as to make sure that no accidental condition is altering it) and is grounded in the real nature of the *jāti* 'universals' involved. In other words, smoke and fire are invariably concomitant because their universals are intrinsically connected and this ensures that the their concomitance is not merely accidental. Accordingly, a so-established *vyāpti* needs to be observed only once. Nonetheless, Sucarita immediately recommends to check it "two to three" or "two to four" times (commentary on v. 42), possibly as part of his attention to the empirical reality of the process of acquiring knowledge (in which misjudgements are possible). This ontological foundationalism of the *vyāpti* is a new addition by Sucarita. Uṃveka seems to remain in the inductive approach to the establishment of the *vyāpti*, since in his commentary to the same verse he only speaks of the need for the two concomitant elements to co-occur in one place, so that they can be simultaneously grasped. The problem is however linked with the possibility to perceive universals (about which see Taber 2017), insofar as if universals were sense-perceivable, then even a single grasp of the concomitance of fire and smoke could assure one of the concomitance of the two corresponding universals.

5.2 Relation to other commentators

Sucarita was most probably aware of Uṃveka's commentary, although I could not detect any explicit acknowledgement of it. At times, he seems to have been influenced by Uṃveka's approach (e.g., the closing statement of his commentary on v. 39 seems to be nothing but a smoother version of Uṃveka's text and the same applies to his whole commentary on v. 44, which repeats Uṃveka's points while avoiding his cumbersome terminological choices, and to the commentary on v. 67), but much more frequently he offers original interpretations, and even individuates different partitions within the text, so that it can easily be said that the ŚV arthāpatti chapter has a different outlook once examined from the perspective of Uṃveka or from the one of Sucarita.

6 Pārthasārathi

The possibly third commentary on the ŚV is the *Nyāyaratnākara* (henceforth NRĀ) by Pārthasārathimiśra, who probably lived in the early eleventh century.[24] Presumably before composing the NRĀ, he also wrote the *Śāstradīpikā*, which is an independent commentary on Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*. He also wrote a commentary on Kumārila's *Ṭupṭīkā* called the *Tantraratna*, and a series of topical essays called *Nyāyaratnamālā*.[25] The latter is modelled on, and

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[24]Kataoka 2011, p. 112. For the text of the NRĀ, see ŚV.

[25]The sequence between the works by Pārthasārathi is not clear and I cannot recall quotations or mentions of the one in the other. On the idea that Sanskrit authors might have

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responds to, a similar collection of works by the rival Mīmāṃsaka Śālikanātha, namely his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.

If Pārthasārathi really composed some of all of these works before the NRĀ, this could partly explain why the latter is, by contrast, mostly an unambitious, plain commentary whose main purpose is clearly just making accessible the –at times terse– ŚV. Pārthasārathi tends to focus mostly on clarifying Kumārila's text, e.g., by means of explicitly pointing out whether a certain strophe represents a prima facie view or the final one and by making implicit connections explicit. He probably meant his commentary to be a practical tool to read the ŚV and indeed the NRĀ has been copied far more than Sucarita's and Uṃveka's commentaries, which have been preserved in one (Uṃveka) or a few (Sucarita) copies only.

6.1   Agenda and contribution

Although Pārthasārathi's commentary does not aim at originality, it contains some unexpected twists. For instance, in replying to the objector, who in v. 77 has suggested that the incongruity between two sets of information which lies at the beginning of a śrutārthāpatti process could be appeased also through a fact, and not necessarily through a sentence, Pārthasārathi assents that seeing Caitra eating at night would in fact be enough. This seems to mean that one would not need śrutārthāpatti at all and that a single arthāpatti would be enough, but Pārthasārathi then adds that this would not work in a Vedic context. Why not? Pārthasārathi is indeed the only one who stresses the consequences of the refusal of postulating a sentence for Vedic hermeneutics in the context of v. 55. There, Pārthasārathi says: "We postulate a linguistic expression in order to establish that the fact, for instance, that the Viśvajit sacrifice has a result is communicated by linguistic communication as an instrument of knowledge". In other words, one needs to postulate sentences in order for these postulated sentences to then convey a meaning which would be then apprehended through language as an instrument of knowledge, just like that of any other Vedic sentence. A non-spelt (but possibly evident) consequence is the following: if one were to solve an inconsistency by postulating directly a concept, instead of the sentence communicating it, one would end up knowing about, e.g., the Viśvajit's result, only through arthāpatti, which appears to be a pramāṇa weaker than śabdapramāṇa, since it lacks its Vedic status. Accordingly, Pārthasārathi's discussion seems to imply that śrutārthāpatti is indeed needed only in a Vedic context. The dubitative form is needed, because the Vedic aspect of śrutārthāpatti is mentioned at times by Pārthasārathi, but not as often as in Sucarita.

Another instance in which Pārthasārathi appears to make an autonomous original contribution is his commentary on vv. 44–45. These verses discuss the impossibility to ascertain an invariable concomitance and, therefore, the impossibility to interpret arthāpatti as a case of anumāna. One of the problems

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composed first independent treatises and later commentaries on influential texts, see Sakai 2015.

in that connection is that there it seems to impossible to ascertain the absence of a person from each single place of the world. There, Pārthasārathi is the only one suggesting to interpret the invariable concomitance as holding between presence in one place (e.g., Caitra's house or garden) and absence from *one* other place, thus avoiding the trap of the impossibility to check one's absence from everywhere else (see below, section 7.2).

6.2   Style and reuse of other commentators

As already observed in Freschi 2008 and Kataoka 2015, Pārthasārathi's NRĀ tends to follow in Sucarita's footsteps and to offer little original insights. Thus, Sucarita's *Kāśikā* (or an oral teaching based on it) was surely a model for Pārthasārathi, who often (e.g., in his commentary on v. 19) reuses its ideas (especially the less audacious ones) and even its terminology (cf. the reuse of the term *vilakṣaṇa sāmagrī* in the commentary on v. 29). A striking example can be found in the commentary on v. 71, where Sucarita has:

> anyo 'pi taddeśakālādisambandho na rātrivākyena divāvākyasya tatpadārthānāṃ vāstīty āha— [...]

> Nor is there another relation through the fact of being in the same place, time, etc. between the night-sentence [i.e., "he eats at night"] and the day-sentence [i.e., "The fat one does not eat at day time"] or its word-meanings. This he (Kumārila) said with [...]

And Pārthasārathi:

> na cāpi taddeśatatkālatvādisambandho divāvākyatatpadārthānāṃ vā rātrivākyenāstīty āha— [...]

> Nor is there a relation through the fact of being in the same place, time, etc. between the night-sentence [i.e., "he eats at night"] and the day-sentence [i.e., "The fat one does not eat at day time"] or its word-meanings. This he (Kumārila) said with [...]

The two sentences are almost identical, and even more telling is the fact that —if the editions are correct— Pārthasārathi puts the day-sentence and its word-meanings together in a compound but then adds, under the influence of Sucarita, an "or" (*vā*) which makes no sense in his new version of the text.

It is also often the case that Pārthasārathi does not at all follow Sucarita's brave interpretations, e.g., in the case of Sucarita's attempts to formalise in several ways (all independent from Kumārila) the absence from home of Caitra as the probans of his being outside in the commentary on v. 10. The same occurs in the case of Sucarita's distinguishing (again, independently of Kumārila) two different functioning ways for arthāpatti in the commentary on v. 46, and in Sucarita's discussion of animal understanding in the commentary on v. 78.

In some cases and especially when Pārthasārathi does not want to follow Sucarita (e.g., in the commentary on v. 26 or on v. 30), it could be imagined that Pārthasārathi is rather elaborating on Uṃveka's commentary. For instance,

v. 55 states that the fact of eating at night cannot be an additional meaning of the sentence "The fat one does not eat at day time". Uṃveka says that this would violate the one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions and meanings. Sucarita only focuses on the fact that sentence is not independently expressive (only its words are). Pārthasārathi combines both points:

> If the sentence were expressive, there would be also the fact that it would have multiple meanings. Nor is the sentence expressive (of any meaning at all).[26]

A similar case occurs at v. 78, which discusses the fact that one needs to postulate a linguistic expression, and not just a state of affairs in the case of śrutārthāpatti. Uṃveka justified this claim by saying that the initial linguistic expression which triggered the whole process needs to have its *bhāvanā* completed. Sucarita rather said that the sentence had expectancy for some further linguistic elements. Pārthasārathi mixes Uṃveka's idea of completion with Sucarita's emphasis on language:

> Since it would be impossible for the sentence as it has been heard ["The fat one does not eat at day time"] to convey a complete meaning, there is expectancy.[27]

Summing up, in several cases Pārthasārathi appears to have been influenced by Uṃveka's interpretation. Nonetheless, I could not detect any literal reuse of Uṃveka's text.[28]

Summing up the situation of Pārthasārathi's sources: Pārthasārathi surely knew Sucarita, but, at least in the arthāpatti section, he was not his only source, neither as for the ŚV text nor as for its interpretation. In most cases, Pārthasārathi's commentary appears to be only a neat exposition of Sucarita's ideas spelt out with more clarity with some added remarks making sense more closely of Kumārila's text and with some further insights, at times coming from Uṃveka, at times probably from Pārthasārathi himself. Thus, Pārthasārathi can be both a pedestrian commentator and reuser of (mostly) Sucarita and a sharp commentator, at times even in nearby sections.

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[26]yadi vākyam vācakaṃ syāt, syād apy anekārthatā, na tu vākyaṃ vācakam.

[27]yathāśrutasya paripūrṇārthapratipādakatvānupapatter asty ākāṅkṣā.

[28]A further, indirect evidence of Uṃveka's influence could be the confusion between the reference to Caitra and to Devadatta. Both names can be used as "John Smith" to refer to a generic individual in Sanskrit literature. The two names are however both found with no reason for the choice of the one or the other in Pārthasārathi's commentary. Pārthasārathi could be just misled by the fact that Śabara speaks of Devadatta's absence from home and Kumārila uses the shorter Caitra. However, Pārthasārathi could also have misunderstood Uṃveka's shift from the one to the other in his commentary on v. 25cd (and then again on vv. 34–35), where the shift is not at all random, since the name Devadatta is used to identify a *sapakṣa* case for Caitra's being outside of home. (The presence of at least a *sapakṣa* is needed according to the definition of a valid inference. Itincludes the cases of a locus akin to the one at stake. In the canonical example, the *sapakṣa* includes cases like fire in the kitchen and it is opposed to the *vipakṣa* cases, i.e., a lake).

7 Comparing the three commentators on specific topics

7.1 Intrinsic validity

A topic which is very much present in all commentators is that of the intrinsic validity of cognitions, which is closely linked to the justification of the validity of arthāpatti. In fact, Kumārila admits that the connection between the *gamaka* 'trigger' of the arthāpatti and its probandum is not known beforehand. When the opponent presses him that arthāpatti would then have no relation to be based on in order to be valid (v. 79) he replies that validity is not caused by a relation (v. 80), but just by the fact of not having been invalidated (yet) (v. 84).[29]

John Taber (Taber 1992) has shown that Umveka, unlike Pārthasārathi and Sucarita,[30] favoured the idea of an ontological basis for Kumārila's epistemology and was not willing to accept fallibilism as an epistemological solution. However, within this section *all* commentators seem to be more cautious than Kumārila on this issue. Umveka (on v. 81) and Sucarita (on v. 79) say that a connection is in fact present, it is just that this cannot or does not need to be grasped. Sucarita stresses (on v. 40) the need of a foundation of inference in the universals at stake, Pārthasārathi ends the section on the non-need of any relation in order to have a valid cognition by saying that there is no need to *grasp* a relation, but that the relation is indeed there.

7.2 Where the commentators do not help (enough): Kumārila on being in one place and not being elsewhere

Kumārila's argument on arthāpatti has been masterly reconstructed in Yoshimizu 2007 and Yoshimizu forthcoming. I can add to these reconstruction the translation cum commentary in Freschi and Ollett forthcoming. Yet, an element of Kumārila's analysis remained so far obscure, namely the shift of perspective occurring at v. 35.

Within the whole section, Kumārila seems to operate under the assumption that a living being is either home or outside (this disjunction is made explicit in Pārthasārathi's Śāstradīpikā, as discussed in Yoshimizu forthcoming, fn. 16). Whereas Yoshimizu forthcoming identifies several elements peculiar to arthāpatti in Kumārila's treatment, Kumārila's *explicit* strategy against the reductionism of arthāpatti to inference seems to be based primarily on two reasons:

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[29]Due to the lack of a specific invariable connection between trigger and thing known, the arthāpatti has been compared to abduction and inference to the best explanation, insofar as these also operate without a pre-existing connection between premises and things to be known. However, unlike these two, arthāpatti is considered to deliver knowledge, not just likelihood and, as discussed in Yoshimizu 2007 for Kumārila and in Freschi forthcoming(a) for Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, it is not open to probabilism.

[30]For Sucarita's account of intrinsic validity, see McCrea 2015–2018 CHECK ADD, for an overview of the entire debate, see Kataoka 2011.

1. there is no way to construe the locus (*pakṣa*), probandum (*sādhya*) and probans (*sādhana*) in a convincing way

2. although there *is* an invariable concomitance between being alive and not home and being outside, this invariable concomitance is *unknown* at the time of the arthāpatti and is only discovered through it (vv. 30–33).

However, in v. 35 the perspective changes. In v. 34 an opponent rebukes to the objection that there would be no way to grasp the invariable concomitance of being alive and not home and being outside (since there would be too many places to check) by suggesting that there would be a way to grasp the invariable concomitance, namely if one stood on the threshold and saw at the same time a person's absence from home and her being elsewhere. What is the kind of concomitance that the opponent claims to be able to establish in this way? It could be either "whenever one is not in one place, then she is somewhere else" or "whenever one is in one place, then she is not somewhere else". The former seems to represent better the working of arthāpatti seen so far. At this point, however, a shift occurs, and the following half-verse deals no longer with the former formulation, but only with the latter. Kumārila can therefore explain that "whenever he is in one place, then he is not somewhere else" involves a quantification over all other places besides the place where Caitra is, and attack this quantification (since no one can check all places).

Here, the point is, like at the beginning of the section, the connection between two elements, which are considered by the reductionist opponent to be probans and probandum, namely the absence from a place and the being elsewhere. Their invariable concomitance cannot be established, explains Kumārila, since one would need to check all instances. Why so? Why would not the check of A be enough, given that Caitra is either in A or in not-A and the two are mutually exclusive? Because the concomitance has been reformulated as being about the being in one place and the not being elsewhere, for which one should be able to check all instances. Attacking this formulation is clearly easier, but is this the only motivation for the shift? Is Kumārila just clever in his twist? Or did he consider the two logically equivalent because of good reasons? For instance, could the latter formulation be considered as a *vipakṣa*-version of the former?[31] Regrettably not, since the *pakṣa*, or locus, needs to be constant and it can therefore only be the living person.

Unfortunately, none of the commentators (and not even Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's discussion of the topic) shed light on this shift. Nonetheless, they are at least helpful in explaining what is at stake in the new formulation. Uṃveka first explains that the elsewhere one is able to grasp from the threshold is a nearby place, the *romaśā*, possibly meaning the garden.

Pārthasārathi makes the point clear: "Now to the person who says that not being at home and being outside can be grasped at the same time even without arthāpatti, provided that one stands in the doorway of the house, the following reply can be made: this is indeed the case, but what is at issue here

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[31]For a short definition of *vipakṣa*, see fn. 28.

is the absence in every other place on the part of a person who exists in a single place, and since those two attributes (namely, being in one place, and not being in every other place) cannot be grasped at the same time, no inference is possible."[32]

Cases such as the following one explain how much this clarification is needed. Kumārila writes in the following verse:

> It is not the case that through non-apprehension the absence of a thing is understood, because one has not gone to those places. For that operates in regard to things which, although distant, do indeed exist.[33]

Uṃveka explains what is at stake:

> Only non-apprehension of things that could be apprehended is a possible reason for their absence, not non- apprehension in general, because that is inconclusive.[34]

In other words, the opponent suggested that we can know about Caitra's absence from anywhere else once we have known of his presence at home and before completing the arthāpatti because of absence as an instrument of knowledge (*abhāvapramāṇa*). But Uṃveka explains that absence works only in regard to what would be fit to be perceived and not in general.

If Uṃveka is right, Kumārila (and/or Uṃveka) might have meant v. 34 as a last attempt by the opponent. The *siddhāntin* had already shown that the example by Śabara could be conceived of as an inference, if one were on the house's door, but still it would not be an inference because it lacks the formal requirements for being conceived as one and because one does not need to know the connection before hand. By contrast, the opposite case, namely, "Having seen Caitra in the *romaśā*, you postulate that he is not anywhere else", cannot be an inference based on absence as instrument of knowledge. Why not? Because absence does only refer to specific places and not to the whole world:

> For, the absence is located in endless places, which are different from the place where Caitra is. [It, the absence] of its correlate presence, (needs to) relate only to a place which is different from the immediately proximate area of the presence of Caitra, which is its correlate. And since there is no comprehension of it (absence in endless places) through other instruments of knowledge, it must be based on arthāpatti.[35]

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[32]yas tu vadati vināpy arthāpattyā gṛhadvāri sthityā gṛhābhāvabahirbhāvayoḥ sāhityaṃ gṛhyata iti, sa vaktavyaḥ yady apy evam iha sambhavati tathāpi yad etad ekatra vidyamānasya sarvatrāvidyamānatvaṃ tat sāhityagrahaṇābhāvān nānumānaṃ siddhyati (Introduction to v. 34).

[33]naitayānupalabdhyātra vastvabhāvaḥ pratīyate | taddeśāgamanāt sā hi dūrastheṣv asti satsv api || 37 ||

[34]dṛśyānupalabdhir abhāve liṅgam, na tv anupalabdhimātram, anaikāntikatvāt (ŚVVTṬ v. 37).

[35]caitrādhiṣṭhitavyatiriktānantadeśagato hy abhāvo bhāvasya sambandhinaḥ saṃnikṛṣṭavy-

8 Conclusions

This short analysis restitutes to its readers the vivid picture of three distinct philosophers and of the way their voice can be heard distinctly even in the genre of commentaries. Uṃveka is the author who is more committed to Kumārila's epistemological approach (this-worldly, anti-reductionist and primarily engaged in logical and epistemological issues). He is not particularly interested in being understood by his readers and is not scared by difficult issues. The present analysis has also shown that he probably worked before Śālikanātha and might have influenced him (unless both rely on a common source). Sucarita is the one who is more open to the Prābhākara approach. He dedicates much more time and energy to exegetical problems and Vedic issues and is more ready to open to further topics, from worldly epistemology to animal one. In a tongue-in-cheek way, one could say that Uṃveka is more of an Analytic philosopher and Sucarita more of a Continental one (but this divide is also often more sociological than substantial). Pārthasārathi's text is closer to a plain commentary. It drives on Sucarita's ideas and possibly also on Uṃveka's ones and tries to explain plainly Kumārila's text. Why so? Possibly because Pārthasārathi, unlike Uṃveka and Sucarita, had already dedicated separate treatises to Mīmāṃsā epistemology and did not feel the need to repeat his own original ideas here. At times, he can nonetheless also add original ideas to the discussion. In the section discussed here, this is particularly evident in the two cases I enucleated as particularly crucial, namely the discussion about the infinite *vipakṣa*s in Caitra's being absent from anywhere else and the one on śrutārthāpatti.

Going back to the methodological issues mentioned at the beginning, I hope to have shown how a close analysis of texts and topics shows that Indian philosophy is not at all uniform and impersonal. It also shows how doing the effort to take texts seriously and to try to make sense of them philosophically can deliver unexpected treasures, from animal epistemology to the linguistic application of śrutārthāpatti.

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atiriktagata eva; tasya ca pramāṇāntareṇāvagamābhāvād arthāpattipūrvakam (ŚVVTṬ on v. 35cd).

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