

Mīmāṃsā between epistemology and hermeneutics: The history of arthāpatti¹

elisa freschi

1 Introduction

Arthāpatti is, according to Mīmāṃsā authors starting with Śābara, a distinct instrument of knowledge, leading one to know out of a given set of facts that something else needs to be the case. The standard examples of it are “Caitra, who is known to be alive, is not home”, leading to “Caitra is outside” and “The fat Devadatta does not eat at day time”, leading to “Devadatta eats at night”. Mīmāṃsā authors contend, against most Naiyāyika ones, that arthāpatti is distinct from inference.² They also claim that it delivers certain knowledge, i.e., that it is not just what contemporary philosophers might call “inference to the best explanation” or “abduction”. This is confirmed by the fact that since the time of the Vṛttikāra the standard example of arthāpatti starts with “Caitra *who is alive* is not home”, whereas “Caitra is not home” would be a suitable start for an inference to the best explanation.³

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Last, I would like to add here also my most heartfelt thanks to John Taber for having helped me at the very beginning of my Mīmāṃsā journey, when I was full of curiosity but had hardly any grasp of this school.

²In the following, I will use *anumāna* and ‘inference’ interchangeably and the same applies to the other names of the instruments of knowledge.

³I derive this point from Yoshimizu forthcoming.

The present article takes the above facts as given and attempts to reconstruct the early history of the theory of arthāpatti and its development within Mīmāṃsā. This allows one to shed light on the early history of Mīmāṃsā and its inner controversies, showing that it was way more manifold than one might have thought.

1.1 Mīmāṃsā from hermeneutics to epistemology and back

The Mīmāṃsā is a school of Indian philosophy which developed since the last centuries BCE. Its foundational text, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (or *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*, henceforth PMS) is traditionally attributed to Jaimini (2nd c. BC?) and is probably the most ancient among the foundational texts of the various philosophical schools in India.⁴ The PMS has been commented upon by one or more authors whose work is lost and who are mentioned by later ones. Notable among them is especially the so-called *ṛttikāra* ‘author of the commentary’, a term which is mentioned by Mīmāṃsā authors and by authors of various Vedānta schools (although it is not completely sure whether one and the same person is meant by all). The first extant commentary is the one which became the standard one, namely the one authored by Śabara (5th c. CE?).⁵ Śabara’s commentary (or *Bhāṣya*, henceforth ŚBh) has been in turn commented upon by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (6–7th c?) and by his younger contemporary Prabhākara Miśra.⁶ To these two is attributed the foundation of the two sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā, named after them Bhaṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. Jaimini and Śabara do not appear to be interested in epistemology as distinct from the core mission of Mīmāṃsā, namely the hermeneutics of Vedic texts; Prabhākara keeps the primary focus on Vedic hermeneutics. By contrast, Kumārila’s target audience is clearly that of the broader arena of Indian philosophers.⁷ For instance, Kumārila’s work would not be conceivable without taking into account that of the Buddhist philosopher Diñnāga (approximately 480–540 CE) and he is often engaged in countering his and others’

⁴I use the abbreviation PMS for practical reasons and not as a hint to the alleged original unity of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and the *Brahmasūtra*.

⁵For the dates of Jaimini and Śabara see Freschi and Pontillo 2013.

⁶On the date of Diñnāga, Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti, and, consequently, of Kumārila and Prabhākara, see Krasser 2012, which revises Frauwallner’s traditional dates and moves Dharmakīrti (and consequently Kumārila and Prabhākara) back to ca. 550. Steinkellner 2013 (with some caution) and Eltschinger 2014 follow Krasser’s suggestion, whereas Franco forthcoming opposes it. Crucial in this connection are the relationship between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti, the statements of some Chinese pilgrims travelling to India and Candrakīrti’s lack of mention of Dharmakīrti. Directly on the chronology of Kumārila see Yoshimizu 2015, fn. 1, where the dates suggested are “ca 560–620”, on the basis of Bhāviveka as *terminus post quem* and the poet Subandhu as *terminus ante quem*.

⁷Traces of this inclination can be found also in the section on the instruments of knowledge by the *Ṛttikāra* quoted by Śabara in his commentary on PMS 1.1.5.

objections to the Mīmāṃsā epistemological tenets. This inclination will not change in Kumārila's commentators.⁸

1.2 Etymology and identity of arthāpatti

How should one interpret the compound arthāpatti? And its single terms?

As for the interpretation of the compound, several early śāstric works (Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Caraka Saṃhitā* and the *Suśruta Saṃhitā*) use expressions like *arthād āpanna* 'obtained because of the *artha*'.⁹ Looking at the respective contexts, this expression might mean something like *arthāt*, i.e., '(obtained) implicitly', 'on the strength of things'. This interpretation of the compound is explicitly attributed to arthāpatti already in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 2.2.1.

As for its constituent terms, *artha* is a complex term, since it has at once an ontological, epistemological, linguistic and deontic meaning. In the first case, it denotes an object, a fact or a state of affairs and can also be used indefinitely as the English 'thing'. In the second it denotes the content of a cognition, in the third the meaning of a linguistic expression and in the last case it denotes a purpose. Within Mīmāṃsā, all these aspects intersect, since the Mīmāṃsā's main focus lies in the deontic sections of the Veda and an *artha* is therefore at once a purpose to be realised and the meaning of a Vedic sentence. At the same time, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas were direct realists in regard to worldly experience, so that an *artha* in the worldly sense was for them a meaning in Frege's sense of *Bedeutung*, thus linking together linguistic and ontology through an epistemologically sound cognition.¹⁰

āpatti is a *nomen actionis* from the root *āpad-* and it indicates the fact of obtaining automatically something, like *prasañj-*. In classical Sanskrit, like *prasaṅga*, it indicates also a negative consequence, even a calamity. By looking at Śālikanātha (see section 5) one sees that he was understanding arthāpatti in this way, namely as the getting in trouble of a thing by means of a (possibly different) thing. However, looking back at earlier Mīmāṃsā, arthāpatti does not have this meaning. Thus, the term might have witnessed a development leading from 'obtainment' (*Mahābhāṣya*, *Caraka Saṃhitā*, *Suśruta Saṃhitā*) through the possible intermediate step of 'automatic obtainment (due to the logical or factual inconsistency of the situation prior to its obtainment)' (Śabara, *Vṛttikāra*, *Yuktidīpikā* (see

⁸Reasons of space forced me to leave out here the discussion of the views on arthāpatti of Kumārila's commentators. This can be read in Freschi forthcoming.

⁹I could locate these occurrences since they are listed and reproduced in Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter 1991, s.v.

¹⁰On *artha* in a Nyāya author who knew a lot of Mīmāṃsā, Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, see Freschi and Keidan 2017, which includes also a discussion of possible translations inspired by Frege and other philosophers of language.

section 2.2)) and until ‘endangerment’ (Śālikanātha). In all these cases, *artha* could be understood as the reason for the *āpatti* (i.e., as *arthād āpatti*, like in the pre-Mīmāṃsā occurrences and in the *Yuktidīpikā*). In the post-Jaimini Mīmāṃsā occurrences, *āpatti* links however *two arthas*, one out of which the *āpatti* takes place and one which is obtained through it.

The difference is not only terminological, since the issue has to do with the definition of *arthāpatti* and the way it is differentiated from inference. This was possibly not an issue for the early Mīmāṃsā (Jaimini is not part of the epistemological debate), so that it is only after the Vṛttikāra —whose quotations are embedded in Śābara’s commentary— that Mīmāṃsā authors became aware of the need to distinguish it from inference. It is possibly because of that, that the Vṛttikāra identified the “impossibility otherwise” as the distinctive mark of *arthāpatti*.

However (as discussed in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, see section 5 and 4), the characteristic of being otherwise impossible could be shared also by inference (if we take as instance the case of a sprout which leads one to infer a seed, one could also say that the sprout is impossible if not through a seed). Hence, some Mīmāṃsā authors felt the need to further specify this impossibility otherwise in a distinctive way. This procedure took two distinctive ways:

1. explaining that the impossibility otherwise leads to a real epistemological doubt in the knower (this path was taken by the unnamed Mīmāṃsā author embedded in Diñnāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 2¹¹ and by Śālikanātha and it could be the reason for the critique of *arthāpatti* found in the **Tarkaśāstra*¹² and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, for which see section 2.2)
2. noting the specific distinctive elements of *arthāpatti* (this path was taken by Prabhākara and Kumārila)

The unnamed Mīmāṃsā opponent quoted within Diñnāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* evoked doubt (which will play a decisive role in Śālikanātha’s reconstruction of the way *arthāpatti* works), possibly with not much emphasis. Diñnāga ruled out the proposal immediately by saying that if doubt played a role within it, *arthāpatti* would not be an instrument of knowledge. This powerful argument might have been the reason why Kumārila preferred a completely different strategy, remained on the safe side of undoubted cognitions and

¹¹As reconstructed on the basis of the quotes within Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary in Steinkellner, Krasser, and Lasic 2005.

¹²**Tarkaśāstra* is the reconstructed title of a logic text of which only a Chinese translation is extant. The translation dates to the Liang Dynasty (552–557 CE). Giuseppe Tucci attempted to reconstruct the Sanskrit text on its basis (see Tucci 1929). If Tucci’s reconstruction is reliable, the **Tarkaśāstra* is a key text for the theory of *anumāna* ‘inference’. I am grateful to Malcolm Keating for having mentioned the passage on *arthāpatti* within the **Tarkaśāstra*.

stressed other dissimilarities between arthāpatti and inference. By contrast, Śālikanātha might have decided to grasp back to this more ancient proposal because of his desire to differentiate them more strongly, even at the risk of having to face objectors claiming that in this way one loses part of the epistemic security of arthāpatti.

1.2.1 Etymology and interpretation of *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti*

The Vṛttikāra mentions a *śruta* and a *dr̥ṣṭa artha* in connection with arthāpatti (see section 2.1). This led to long discussions about *dr̥ṣṭa-* and *śrutārthāpatti* in Kumārila and among the Prābhākaras. But how are these terms to be interpreted in early Mīmāṃsā and among later authors?

Out of symmetry with *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*, possibly meaning ‘reaching an *artha* out of something experienced’, we can assume that the compound *śrutārthāpatti* was originally meant to be interpreted as ‘reaching an *artha* out of something heard’. Out of the below discussion (see section 3.3), however, it will be clear that in later Mīmāṃsā, its distinctive element was no longer the fact of being *originated* out of an auditory cognition, but rather the fact of *resulting* in one. In this sense, a *śrutārthāpatti* became rather an arthāpatti resulting in the postulation of something hearable. In Uṃveka’s words: “Since the *śrutārthāpatti* has as its content an instrument of knowledge (i.e., a sentence), it is different from the *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*” (ad ŚV, arthāpatti 76).

Why this dissymmetry? The question has to do with the distinction of two types of arthāpatti, possibly already in the Vṛttikāra’s quote within Śābara, for which see section 2.1. It is, as will be seen, possible that the Vṛttikāra conceived of *dr̥ṣṭa* and *śruta arthas* in a way different than what became of the two arthāpattis at a later stage. The later elaboration of what was the distinctive element in the two arthāpattis led the two further from each other (see section 8 in Freschi forthcoming).

2 arthāpatti in early Mīmāṃsā

2.1 *śruta* and *dr̥ṣṭa* objects in Jaimini and the Vṛttikāra: epistemological and hermeneutic concerns at stake

Jaimini does not define arthāpatti, whereas the Vṛttikāra defines it in just the following short passage:

arthāpattir api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho ’nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā, yathā jīvato devadattasya gr̥hābhāvarāsanena bahirbhāvasya adr̥ṣṭasya kalpanā.

And the arthāpatti is the postulation of something when a seen or heard thing would not otherwise make sense. For example: One has experienced that Devadatta, who is alive, is not at home. Through that one postulates that he is outside, which had not been experienced.

It is noteworthy, given the shortness of the definition, that the Vṛttikāra feels the need to distinguish between a *dr̥ṣṭa* ‘seen’ and a *śruta* ‘heard’ arthāpatti. In fact, Kumārila and his subcommentators all discussed the issue at length and offered acute epistemological explanations (see section 8 in Freschi forthcoming), which are, however, unlikely to be the ones the Vṛttikāra had in mind.

The term arthāpatti is used several times as designating a hermeneutical device already in the PMS (PMS 7.4.16; 7.4.18; 10.1.30; 10.3.35; 10.4.35), with no further attribute. There it is (as mostly the case within the PMS) applied to Vedic sentences. This makes one think that arthāpatti developed within Mīmāṃsā as a hermeneutic device to be applied to the Veda. Furthermore, the PMS in general and the specific context of these quotes in particular point in the direction of *artha* in a non-descriptive sense as ‘effect’, with arthāpatti as ‘obtainment of an *artha* (i.e., obtainment of an effect)’, against the interpretation of arthāpatti as deriving from *arthād āpattiḥ* in the **Tarkaśāstra* and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (see section 1.2).¹³

Given the Vedic context of the first usages of arthāpatti in Mīmāṃsā, the **worldly use** of arthāpatti could be a secondary development, or at least the connection of both under a single hat could be. This innovation would have called for a distinguishing label. Hence, it might be imagined, the Vṛttikāra’s decision to distinguish a *śruta* and a *dṛṣṭa* case, which would refer respectively to an arthāpatti regarding the Veda (generally called *śrutī*) and one regarding common experience (generally called *darśana*). This would also explain why the Vṛttikāra felt the need to add an **example** only of the second type: the first one was assumed to be clear to the Vṛttikāra’s readers, who were Mīmāṃsakas and therefore conversant with Vedic exegesis. Last, the criticism of arthāpatti as not leading to certain knowledge as attested in Vātsyāyana and in the **Tarkaśāstra* might have been current already before the time of the Vṛttikāra and have prompted him to insert the qualification *jīvan* ‘alive’ to the example of the person absent from home. In this way, the Vṛttikāra was sure to link arthāpatti to **certainty**. All three moves will be reinforced by Kumārila’s systematization.

Why taking these decisions? The Vṛttikāra was probably the first Mīmāṃsā author who attempted to emphasise the general epistemological side of Mīmāṃsā, as attested by the fact that he was the first one discussing *pramāṇas* ‘instruments of knowledge’ as worldly epistemic instruments and no longer only as Vedic exegetical devices. In this sense, the Vṛttikāra possibly anticipated Kumārila’s agenda of placing Mīmāṃsā in the middle of the philosophical arena. This attitude was possibly at play also in the treatment of arthāpatti.

The early history of arthāpatti as exegetical device was possibly lost in the background after Kumārila’s reconfiguration of the topic as a chiefly epistemological problem, so that his commentators had to argue at length about the need and the correct way of distinguishing a *śruta* and a *dṛṣṭa* type of arthāpatti (see section 8 in Freschi forthcoming).

¹³See the discussion of these passages in Yoshimizu 2000b and an excerpt of it below, p. 9.

2.2 arthāpatti in pre-Kumārila philosophy: epistemological and hermeneutic trends

Traces of a competing discourse on arthāpatti can be detected in the **Tarkaśāstra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Diñnāga's refutation of a Mīmāṃsā Vṛttikāra and also in the *Yuktidīpikā* (henceforth YD) (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 73).¹⁴ Diñnāga's text (available in Tibetan and in a German translation in Frauwallner 1968, p. 91 and then within Jinendrabuddhi's commentary thereon in Steinkellner, Krasser, and Lasic 2005) mentions the same example of Devadatta's being out of home (incorrectly or alternatively construed as an example of *abhāva* 'absence as an instrument of knowledge') but before that divides arthāpatti in conclusive and false. The same partition can be found in the YD which calls them *vyabhicārin* 'deviating' (from truth) and *avyabhicārin* 'not deviating'. By that, authors opposing the idea of arthāpatti as a distinct instrument of knowledge refer to the cases of arthāpatti which are just misleading and the cases of arthāpatti which yield valid cognitions, but should be considered inferences. Both texts then speak of worldly examples. More in detail, Diñnāga's text mentions the example of knowing out of seeing prepared food that it must have been cooked. It also mentions the snake-mongoose example (you see a dead snake and conclude that it must have been killed by a mongoose), but as a case of inference, possibly because it was considered as such by Sāṅkhya authors and these were for Diñnāga more influential as opponents than Mīmāṃsā authors (see Steinkellner, Krasser, and Lasic 2005). The YD mentions the same example in connection with arthāpatti, but using boar and lion instead of snake and mongoose. It also mentions the case of knowing sweetness upon seeing jaggery or hearing the word jaggery. The YD account, though short, contains further elements which will be found again in Mīmāṃsā discussions, so that it seems plausible that it is reacting to a position held by a Mīmāṃsā author. These are the mention of the relation (*sambandha*) between trigger and thing known (which are used by the *siddhāntin* to show that the alleged arthāpatti is nothing but an inference) and the mention of *darśana* 'seeing' and *śravaṇa* 'hearing' as two alternative sources for arthāpatti, as in the Vṛttikāra.

Within Nyāya, the *Nyāyasūtras* mention arthāpatti as not being an instrument of knowledge, insofar as it is not conclusive (NS 2.2.3). Vātsyāyana (late fifth century?) mentions arthāpatti while commenting on the *Nyāyasūtras* 2.2.1–6. His short comments are

¹⁴Here and in the following I am assuming that the Mīmāṃsā position embedded in the YD is older than Kumārila's. Wezler and Motegi date the YD to 680–720 due to an alleged quote from the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, which is however not necessarily a quote and could be only a similar grammatical formulation (I owe this argument to Karin Preisendanz, who discussed it in a class on the YD in 2008). Even if the YD had been written after Kumārila, its position on arthāpatti attests of a pre-Kumārila stage of the reflection on this instrument of knowledge, since it elaborates on examples, such as the one about natural enemies which were rejected by Kumārila.

interesting for several reasons. First, Vātsyāyana analyses arthāpatti as *arthād āpattiḥ*. Second, he criticises arthāpatti as not a conclusive instrument of knowledge on the basis of the following example: rain does not occur when there are no clouds, hence, when there are clouds there is rain. This might be the remote cause of an example mentioned by Gaṅgeśa (see section 6). According to Giuseppe Tucci's reconstruction, the same etymology for arthāpatti and the same example are found already in the **Tarkaśāstra*.¹⁵

Summing up, arthāpatti must have been already discussed as an instrument of knowledge different from inference, possibly at the same time of the *Vṛttikāra*, and was possibly criticised because it did not attain certainty.

One wonders, therefore, if there were not two competing trends on arthāpatti, the hermeneutical one found in Jaimini and the epistemological-worldly one reflected in the *Nyāyasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya*, the **Tarkaśāstra*, Dīnnāga and in the YD already before the time of Kumārila. On a more speculative note, one might even suggest that the mention of *darśana* and *śravaṇa* in the YD might be a hint of the fact that some thinkers were already trying to bring the two together under the same hat.

The Mīmāṃsaka *vṛttikāra* 'author of the comment' quoted by Dīnnāga would thus be, like the one quoted by Śabara,¹⁶ an engaged epistemologist, opposing the (possibly more traditional) trend of purely Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics.

Śabara falls somehow in between, as in many other cases. Among his usages of arthāpatti, several ones are hermeneutically-oriented (e.g., when he uses some form of what Kumārila would call *śrutārthāpatti* in his commentary on PMS 3.1.10, 3.3.14, 3.6.37, 6.1.1, 6.1.3 in order to justify a given Vedic interpretation), but arthāpatti is also mentioned (interestingly, by opponents) within epistemological issues such as the postulation of an author of the relation between linguistic expressions and meanings (ŚBh on PMS 1.1.5), of a capacity of language to convey the sentence-meaning independently of the word-meanings (ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25) and of an author of the Veda (ŚBh on PMS 1.1.30). However, the fact that arthāpatti is mentioned in these cases by opponents embedded in the ŚBh could also be read as confirming that this trend was present in Mīmāṃsā, but remained marginal until Kumārila.

These two trends ideally continued in the work of Prabhākara (more hermeneutical and Veda-centered, for whom arthāpatti is essentially a hermeneutical device and there is

¹⁵See Tucci 1929, p. 25 of the **Tarkaśāstra* Sanskrit text: ko 'sau nyāyo yenaitad arthād āpattir bhavet. yad anabhivyaktaṃ tad atyantam asad iti naitad arthād āpadyate. abhivyaktaṃ dvididham anarthāpattir arthāpattiś ca. yadi vṛṣṭir bhavati tadā meghenāpi bhavitavyam. meghe saty api tu kadācid vṛṣṭir bhavati kadācin na bhavatīty anaikāntikatā. dhūmenāgner anumānam. nārthād āpattiḥ. [...] kasmād iti cet. taptāyaḥpiṇḍe lohitāngāre ca dhūmābhāve 'py agneḥ sadbhāvaḥ. tasmād abhivyakteṣv arthāpattikhaṇḍanam abhūtam.

¹⁶See Frauwallner 1968, p. 98 for a refutation of their identification.

no need to separate between a *dṛṣṭa*- and a *śruta*- type) and Kumārila (more epistemological and interested in wider philosophical debates). It is, accordingly, not surprising that Kumārila’s commentators struggled with finding a possible explanation for the opposition between *śruta* and *dṛṣṭa* in the ŚBh. The opposition had in fact originated within a different context (the conflation of a primarily epistemological and primarily hermeneutic arthāpatti) than the one of these commentators’ philosophical engagement.

A further element which is typical of early Mīmāṃsā is that it is much more variegated than it became later. The opponents embedded in Dinnāga and in the YD, as well as the voices found in the **Tarkaśāstra* and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* use different examples and the YD even avoids mentioning the one which later became the standard one, namely “Caitra, who is alive, is not home, therefore he must be somewhere outside”.

A last question needs some closer examination, namely whether the two understandings of arthāpatti are originally fully unrelated. In order to answer, let me start by summing up the difference between arthāpatti as used by Vedic exegetes and by epistemologists:

	exegetes	epistemologists
field of application examples <i>artha</i>	Vedic sentences Vedic sentences dynamic	worldly experience absence from home, eating, snake... descriptive

One could now imagine that one has to do with two radically different concepts, one of which developed within Mīmāṃsā whereas the other came to it from outside. This hypothesis is the one endorsed in the only rigorous study of the prehistory of arthāpatti, namely Yoshimizu 2000b:

In the JS [=PMS], the term “arthāpatti” always means “take effect” (**artham āpadyate*). Therefore, we may say that Mīmāṃsaka’s convention of calling a kind of *pramāṇa* ‘instrument of knowledge’ with the term “arthāpatti” cannot be traced back to the time of the compilation of the JS, but rather it was introduced from outside, such as the tradition of *tantrayukti*. One and the same word was established in a totally different meaning.¹⁷

¹⁷Since I cannot read Japanese, I completely depend on the explanation of the article Kiyotaka Yoshimizu was kind enough to offer me. The passage above is the conclusion of the first section of Yoshimizu 2000b, p. 1113.

A benefit of this view is that it accounts for the competing etymologies of arthāpatti and for the presence of the term arthāpatti in different contexts, i.e., as a pseudo logical reason (called *arthāpattisama hetu* or *arthāpattyābhāsa*). The problem with this view is that it presupposes the existence of a group of people (let me call them again “the epistemologists”) who were outside Mīmāṃsā but did not influence *any other school but* Mīmāṃsā. Therefore, I would like to fine-tune Yoshimizu’s theory by rather speaking of different trends active not only outside of Mīmāṃsā, but also already *within* early Mīmāṃsā, some of which were represented in the PMS and some not. The PMS would be the chief text for (part of) the exegetical component within Mīmāṃsā, but not necessarily for the whole of Mīmāṃsā. In this view, the first two differences mentioned in the table above could be explained as part of a difference in the main focus. The different understanding of *artha* could also be explained on the basis of the Vedic vs. worldly focus, insofar as having a Vedic focus means focusing on the deontic dimension and therefore on *artha* as something to be done and not as the description of a state of affairs.

Further, the very inner-Mīmāṃsā history of the term arthāpatti discussed by Yoshimizu would have been problematic from the viewpoint of the “epistemologists”, so that it is difficult to imagine that *they* devised such a label for the instrument of knowledge they had in mind (and which they could have more easily called *anyathānupapatti* ‘impossibility otherwise’ or *kalpanā* ‘postulation’). The re-semanticisation of a term which was already in use in the school appears, by contrast, to be more convincing. Lars Göhler has pointed out similar cases of an epistemological re-semanticisation within Mīmāṃsā, e.g., in the case of *upamāna* ‘analogy’ (Göhler 2011).

Last, the arthāpatti examples mentioned in the **Tarkaśāstra* (and by Vātsyāyana), by Diñnāga and in the YD (and by Diñnāga’s commentator Jinendrabuddhi) will be ignored or explicitly refuted (in the case of the snake-mongoose one) by Kumārila and later Mīmāṃsā authors. At least one of the examples which became standard for arthāpatti is discussed by Diñnāga in the topic of *abhāva*, whereas further examples will be recognised as cases of inference. It appears, in sum, that the pre-Diñnāga or pre-Kumārila philosophy was still struggling to find uniform definitions for each *pramāṇa*.

3 Kumārila: arthāpatti within the epistemological landscape

All Indian philosophical schools but the Cārvākas accept that sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference are instruments of knowledge. All the remaining ones but the Vaiśeṣika and the Diñnāga-Dharmakīrti school accept also linguistic communication as a distinct instrument of knowledge (*śabda*). Among the remaining ones, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā accept also *upamāna* ‘analogy’. Mīmāṃsakas remain alone in accepting also arthāpatti and the Prābhākara subschool of Mīmāṃsā parts company from the Bhāṭṭa subschool when it comes to *abhāva* ‘absence as an instrument of knowledge’, since the Bhāṭṭas accept it and the Prābhākaras do not. The schools which do not accept linguistic communication, analogy,

arthāpatti and absence as independent instruments of knowledge, generally try to reduce them to a form of inference. This choice is due to the basic distinction between sense perception and inference and to the clear precinct of application of the former, so that reductionism automatically translates into reduction to inference.¹⁸

It is therefore important to highlight the basic features of inference in Indian thought. In its basic form accepted by all schools, this links a known property which is present in a given locus to an inferable property present in the same locus. The non-accidental nature of the relation between the known property and the inferable one needs to be confirmed with an example of the same concomitance. The known property (or probans) is called *liṅga*, *dharma* or *hetu* (H), the locus is called *pakṣa* (P) or *dharmin* and the inferable property (or probandum) is called *sādhya* (S). Unlike in Ancient Greek philosophy, the possibility of syllogisms with empty terms is ruled out by the necessary presence of an example in which S and H co-occur. The example is called *dr̥ṣṭānta* (D) or *udāharaṇa*. Thus:

That is: the presence of the probans (H) in the locus (P) leads one to infer that the probandum (S) is also found in the locus (P). In the standard example used by Indian authors:

On the mountain (P) there is fire (S), because there is smoke (H), as in the kitchen (where smoke and fire occur together) (D).

At least one generation before Kumārila, Diṅnāga formulated the three requirements for a valid inference (*trairūpya*), namely:

1. Presence of the probans in the locus (e.g., presence of smoke in the mountain)
2. Presence of the probans in locations similar to the locus (called *sapakṣa*) (e.g., presence of smoke in the kitchen)
3. Absence of the probans in locations dissimilar from the locus (called *vipakṣa*) (e.g., absence of smoke from the lake)

This defined the key elements of a valid inference as follows:

fire: *sādhya* or thing to be inferred

smoke: *hetu* or inferential reason

mountain: *pakṣa* or locus

kitchen and other fiery places: *sapakṣa* or similar instances

pond and other places devoid of fire: *vipakṣa* or dissimilar instances

¹⁸A partial exception is the Nyāya attempt to read *abhāva* as perception of something else and Udayana's isolated attempt to reduce *upamāna* to *śabdapramāṇa*.

Much of the anti-reductionist discussion in the chapters of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* (henceforth ŚV, the commentary dedicated by Kumārila to the epistemological section of the PMS and the ŚBh) dealing with linguistic communication, analogy, arthāpatti and absence focuses on whether or not a correct inference can be built in these cases.¹⁹ For instance, the chapter on language refutes the idea that linguistic communication can be reduced to inference by explaining how the relation between *śabda* 'linguistic expression' and *artha* 'meaning' cannot be formalised as above, since linguistic expressions would figure as both the locus and the probans. A similar strategy will be implemented by Kumārila also in the chapter on arthāpatti (see below, section 3.2).

A further building block of Kumārila's refutation of the reduction of arthāpatti to inference presupposes his main epistemological tenet. In fact, as for epistemology in general, Kumārila's school upholds the *svataḥ prāmāṇya*, that is the 'intrinsic validity' of cognitions, according to which each cognition should be credited with validity without further verifications immediately and until it is falsified by a *bādha* 'subsequent invalidating cognition'.²⁰ The topic of intrinsic validity is often evoked in the context of arthāpatti, since the reductionist side contends that if arthāpatti is not reduced to inference, and is therefore not seen as grounded on an invariable concomitance, there is no strong basis for its validity. Kumārila and his commentators answer that the relation of invariable concomitance is indeed the cause for the *production* of inferential cognitions, but it is not the cause for the *validity* of neither these nor any other cognition. By contrast, they claim that a cognition is valid until an invalidating cognition arises (see vv. 79–86 and Sucarita's commentary on v. 29).

3.1 Structure of the argument in the *Ślokavārttika*

The arthāpatti section is a comparatively short one and it is located in the section of the ŚV dedicated to an analysis of all instruments of knowledge. Kumārila's main purposes in this section are:

1. Highlighting the main features of arthāpatti
2. Proving that it is different from inference
3. Distinguishing between a *dr̥ṣṭa* and a *śruta* type of arthāpatti

The first and the second objectives are deeply connected, since showing the specific characters of arthāpatti amounts to proving that it is not just an inference.

¹⁹Several studies have been dedicated to the various articulations of the Mīmāṃsā antireductionism. On *abhāva* in Mīmāṃsā see Taber 2001, on *śabda* and inference, see Taber 1996 and Taber 2002.

²⁰For more on the topic, see the groundbreaking and insightful Taber 1992.

3.2 Kumārila's strategy

Just like throughout the *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila's strategy in the arthāpatti chapter is characterised by some leitmotifs:

1. Defending arthāpatti as part of an **epistemological** debate. The impact on Mīmāṃsā of the admission of arthāpatti is dealt with only laterally, and Kumārila clearly wants to ground the validity of arthāpatti independently of Vedic hermeneutical reasons. Therefore, he postpones the discussion on the variety of arthāpatti which would be more relevant for Vedic exegesis, namely the *śrutārthāpatti* after a first, purely epistemological discussion on *drṣṭārthāpatti*. Similarly, the discussion of its Vedic applications is only dealt with at the end of the epistemological analysis of *śrutārthāpatti*. Last, one of the fields of application of arthāpatti, namely the existence of *apūrva*, is not discussed by Kumārila (it will be, by contrast, discussed by Gaṅgeśa, see section 6).
2. **Elasticity** in the approach: Kumārila is radically non-dogmatic and is always willing to adopt one or the other solution, if only the main tenets of the system are preserved (see his willingness to consider the deduction of past rain on the basis of a flooded river as an inference or an arthāpatti, v. 18; or his openness towards *calling* arthāpatti *anumāna*, if one wants, v. 88).²¹
3. **Antireductionism**: Kumārila is against the attempt to reduce the multifaceted processes of cognition-acquisition to the rigid scheme of inference.

The above points converge in Kumārila's epistemological agenda, which mainly aims at justifying as much as possible of common cognitions (as explained in Taber 2001 with regard to absence as an instrument of knowledge). It provides therefore a framework which is flexible enough to accommodate as much as possible of common cognitions which can be interpreted as instances of arthāpatti and therefore deliberately avoids proposing an all-too-rigid scheme for the functioning of arthāpatti.

Concerning the antireductionism, Kumārila has three main arguments:

1. i arthāpatti lacks the formal structure of inference (see ŚV arthāpatti vv. 11–24)
2. ii In arthāpatti one does not need to be aware of an invariable concomitance (v. 30 and vv. 79–86)
3. iii In arthāpatti, the conclusion is implied in the premises (see ŚV arthāpatti v. 29).

²¹For the same attitude in the chapter on sense perception, see the introductory study in Taber 2005.

The confutation of the identification of arthāpatti with a sort of inference starts, just like the confutation of the identification of linguistic communication with a sort of *anumāna* in the relevant chapters of the ŚV (śabdapariccheda and vākyādhikaraṇa), with a **formal analysis**. This shows that it is impossible to detect the fixed constituents of a valid *anumāna* in the case of arthāpatti. That is, and using the standard examples of arthāpatti (“Caitra, who is alive, is not at home, therefore he is outside”) and inference (“On the mountain there is fire because there is smoke”), the former lacks the constituent elements of the latter, namely a probans (smoke), a locus (the mountain) and a probandum (fire).²²

The second point might look controversial, since one could object that one does need to know something about Caitra’s being either home or outside in order to move from the knowledge of his absence from home to his presence outside. However, Kumārila is quite straightforward in denying the pre-existing knowledge of a relation. Rather, he explains, one becomes aware of the relation only at the end, *through* arthāpatti, so that, paradoxically, at the end of the whole process, one knows the relation of invariable concomitance on the basis of which one could be able to start an *anumāna* (which would be useless for the current case). I will come back to this topic in a few lines (section 3.2.1).

The third point is discussed also as point (ii) in Yoshimizu forthcoming and in Yoshimizu 2007 and it is the one which more directly suggests that arthāpatti is deductive in nature, since the conclusions are contained in the premises.²³

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu (Yoshimizu 2007, pp. 321–324 and Yoshimizu forthcoming) elaborates on a further move by Kumārila, which is largely implicit in Kumārila; Yoshimizu needed to dig it out through a formalisation of Kumārila’s arguments:²⁴

4. iv In the view of Kumārila, the basic operative unit for arthāpatti is a sentence (proposition), not a term, unlike in the case of Diñnāga’s logic, which used single terms for expressing the universal relationship between *dharma* and *dharmin* in a certain domain of discourse (see ŚV arthāpatti v. 64).

²²See ŚV arthāpatti, vv. 11–15, translated and analysed in Freschi and Ollett forthcoming.

²³Unlike that, in inference based on causal connections, there is nothing intrinsic in the effect itself (e.g., smoke) which would necessarily lead to its cause (e.g., fire), unless one knew about their connection. The conclusion is, by contrast, contained in the premises in the inference based on *tādātmya* ‘identity’, such as the one from *śiṃśapā* ‘Aśoka tree’ to its being a tree. On causality and identity as the two kinds of relation accepted in Dharmakīrti’s theory of syllogism and on their application to the problem of reducing linguistic communication to a case of inference, see Taber, Krasser, and Eltschinger 2012, fn. 113.

²⁴I gratefully acknowledge Kiyotaka Yoshimizu’s help (per email and in person) in understanding this aspect of Kumārila’s strategy.

In other words, an inference operates on the basis of general valid connections among properties and property-bearers. By contrast, an arthāpatti works on specific situations, which —insofar as they are specific— can only be represented through sentences, not names (as explained in ŚV vākyādhikaraṇa). It does not work, e.g., on the basis of the general connection between the property of being somewhere and the property of being absent anywhere else. Rather, it works on the basis of Caitra’s concrete absence from home. Although Kumārila does not spell out this difference, it is in this sense telling that he always speaks of Caitra and not of ‘someone’ in general. The only exception is v. 46, speaking of a person (*puruṣa*) but this verse is part of the reasoning explaining that arthāpatti is preliminary to inference. In fact, Kumārila explains that one cannot possibly grasp the invariable concomitance between being in one place and not being anywhere else (or vice versa) as long and until one does not know both the connected elements (*sambandhin*) and one does not know them before the arthāpatti has taken place because one of the two (for instance, Caitra’s being somewhere else) is just not available to one’s awareness. Kumārila explains that once one has known both connected elements, one can implement an inference.

3.2.1 On arthāpatti and the establishment of the invariable concomitance

It appears that (see v. 32) one first needs to use arthāpatti and then can use inference in future occurrences of a similar case.²⁵ What does this exactly mean? The *pars destruens* of the argument is clear, namely that one cannot perform an inference since one does not know the invariable concomitance. But in what sense can one then perform an *anumāna* after having performed the arthāpatti? Which invariable concomitance did one become aware of? The invariable concomitance between Caitra’s being alive and not home and his being outside? If so, then this means that one will only be able to infer that *Caitra* is outside the next time one knows that he is alive and sees that he is not home. This seems limited. Alternatively, one could imagine that, after having known through arthāpatti that Caitra is outside, one were able to infer that Devadatta is outside by knowing that he is alive and seeing that he is not home. If it were so, however, arthāpatti would work on the basis of terms which can be generalised, and not just particular sentences. Could it be that one cannot infer that Caitra is outside because one is *not aware* of the invariable concomitance between being home and alive and being outside, and that arthāpatti is needed in order to become aware of something which was implicit in the premises, but not cognitively available to the epistemic subject? In this sense, arthāpatti would be needed to become aware of the invariable concomitance. This interpretation comes close to Prabhākara’s idea that in the case of arthāpatti one only knows the connection in general between two things and not the particularised one, see section 4. Kumārila does not discuss this interpretation, possibly because he was not aware of Prabhākara’s view.

²⁵This move is particularly clear in Sucarita’s commentary.

3.2.2 Who are Kumārila's main opponents in this chapter?

In the first part, dedicated to the epistemological foundation of arthāpatti, the main opponent is an epistemologist, who wants to reduce arthāpatti to *anumāna*. Among Indian philosophical schools the two which were more committed to reductionism to inference are the Nyāya (later enlarged to embrace Vaiśeṣika) and the Dīnnāga-Dharmakīrti school. Against the identification of Kumārila's main opponents with philosophers of the Dīnnāga-Dharmakīrti school runs the fact that the authors of this school dedicate much energy to the reduction of linguistic communication to inference, whereas arthāpatti is not a relevant topic for them. By contrast, Nyāya authors have extensive sections on it and arthāpatti is criticised already in the *Nyāyasūtra*. However, the Nyāya school is never mentioned in Kumārila's arthāpatti section, whereas an explicit mention of *bauddha* 'Buddhists' is found in Sucarita's commentary on v. 40 and more significantly in Pārthasārathi's commentary on v. 83. Last, Kumārila himself points out again and again that the same discussion has been raised in the context of the śabdādihikaraṇa, in the section where the (Vaiśeṣika) opponent tried to construe an inference on the basis of the relation between linguistic expression and meaning. That the first section of the arthāpatti chapter is devised against this type of opponent is confirmed by the fact that nowhere does Kumārila hint at the possibility that Caitra's absence from home could be known through *abhāvapramāṇa* 'absence', an instrument of knowledge rejected by all schools apart from Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, whereas he discusses *anupalabdhi* 'non-apprehension', which is a valid probans in an inference according to the Dīnnāga-Dharmakīrti school. Summing up, the first part of the arthāpatti chapter is targeted to non-Mīmāṃsakas, possibly to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas or Buddhist epistemologists. It is possible that scholars know only little about the latter's position on arthāpatti because the texts of their own school had no direct interest in recording the polemics with Mīmāṃsā on arthāpatti.

The situation changes in the second part of ŚV arthāpatti, dedicated to *śrutārthāpatti*, where the interlocutors are mainly other Mīmāṃsakas and what is at play is chiefly the correct interpretation of Vedic hermeneutical devices such as *ūha* (about which see fn. 29). Interestingly, Kumārila does not seem to be aware of Prabhākara's position, which refuses the distinction between two types of arthāpatti and which became the topic of a hot debate in later texts. Kumārila does not address at all the question of whether *śrutārthāpatti* should be denied a separate position and seems to start with the assumption that one only needs to define what is *śrutārthāpatti*.²⁶

²⁶This could be a further hint at the idea that Kumārila, though aware of some Prabhākara-like ideas, was not aware of Prabhākara himself and was therefore most likely a senior contemporary of him. On the major arguments for this date, see Yoshimizu 1997.

3.3 *śrutārthāpatti*

It has already been stated that what will be later called *śrutārthāpatti* was probably the first kind of arthāpatti devised by early Mīmāṃsā authors, who were by far more interested in Vedic exegesis than in finding out whether Devadatta's being outside once he has not been seen at home is epistemologically grounded.

The hermeneutical background of the *śrutārthāpatti* is acknowledged by Kumārila too in ŚV arthāpatti vv. 87–88, where he states that many Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic strategies would become invalid if *śrutārthāpatti* were not accepted.²⁷

Still, in harmony with his general agenda (see section 3.2), Kumārila tries to establish his epistemology independently of the needs of Vedic exegesis, so that Mīmāṃsā is made fit to fight a purely philosophical battle, without having to recur to hermeneutical applications of it.

Accordingly, Kumārila (or perhaps one or the other *vṛttikāra* before him, see section 2.2 and fn. 6) proposed a worldly example for *śrutārthāpatti*, namely:

"The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime"

The linguistic incongruity raised by this sentence, according to Kumārila, expects a linguistic completion, namely the sentence:

"He eats at night"

The latter sentence is not actually heard and needs therefore to be postulated through *śrutārthāpatti*. An opponent in v. 77 asks whether the linguistic incongruity could not be appeased by a fact, rather than a sentence, such as seeing the same person eating at night. The commentators have troubles answering and find different ways to deal with it. Actually, the example mentioned by Kumārila to prove the need of a separate *śrutārthāpatti* is only partly adequate, since the incongruity in the sentence "The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime" seems to be more a factual than a linguistic one, more similar to the incongruity of Caitra's²⁸ absence from home than to a purely linguistic incongruity (such as, perhaps, the lack of a verb in a sentence). The examples of *śrutārthāpatti* derived from Vedic hermeneutics appear to be much more convincing, since within Vedic exegesis it is often the case that one needs to supply linguistic expressions, not just concepts. For instance,

²⁷Further notes on Kumārila's introduction of *śrutārthāpatti* can be read in Freschi forthcoming.

²⁸Kumārila appears to be the first one who uses Devadatta as the name used for the example about the fat person and Caitra as the name used for the example about being outside. I will stick with this use in order to keep them apart, even while discussing Prabhākara, who goes back to the *Vṛttikāra* and uses the name Devadatta for the person absent from home.

mantras need to be adapted by means of specific words, when they need to be uttered in a way which fits the changed circumstances (e.g., a mantra for a given deity may need to be uttered in a different ritual and be dedicated to a different one, so that the deity's name needs to be updated).²⁹

A further role for *śrutārthāpatti* could be the establishment of *apūrva*.³⁰ This is, in Kumārila's reinterpretation, the unseen force bridging the gap between a sacrifice and its result.³¹ This needs to be postulated, according to Kumārila, in order to solve the seeming paradox between two facts:

- a) The Veda must be true when it says that a sacrifice leads one to its corresponding result.
- b) The sacrifice is completed since a long time by the time the result should arise, hence it cannot be its cause.

The solution is that the sacrifice produces a new (*apūrva*) force leading to the result. This argumentation seems to suggest that the instrument to know about *apūrva* must be *arthāpatti*. More in detail, in the *Tantravārttika* (henceforth TV) commentary ad PMS 2.1.5 (BSS p. 361), Kumārila states that the *apūrva* can be known out of *śrutārthāpatti*. However, as noted by Yoshimizu (1999), *apūrva* is a content, not a linguistic expression and in this sense it should be obtained through *drṣṭa-*, not *śrutārthāpatti*, notwithstanding Kumārila's assertion. Yoshimizu therefore concludes that there are indeed some discrepancies in Kumārila's attempt to embed *apūrva* in his theory, due to the fact that he needed to embed two pre-existing theories (*arthāpatti* and *apūrva*) into his new interpretation. I would add that the idea of linking *apūrva* with *śrutārthāpatti* makes sense if one considers the early history of *śrutārthāpatti* as described above (section 2.1). Kumārila's *apūrva* could be obtained through *Jaimini and Śabara's śrutārthāpatti* because it is a Vedic concept, although one cannot use *Kumārila's śrutārthāpatti* for it, since it is a concept, not a sentence. The TV passage could be interpreted in this light as a slip into the preceding terminology about *śrutārthāpatti*. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as just the abbreviated form of the whole argument: Through *śrutārthāpatti* one postulates a further Vedic *sentence* about *apūrva*, in order to make sense of the contrast between Vedic sentences about a) and the fact b) (above). Out of this postulated sentence, through *śabdapramāṇa*, one knows about *apūrva* as concept. The latter interpretation is the one presented by Gaṅgeśa (see below. section 6).

²⁹This procedure is called *ūha*.

³⁰This is suggested in Yoshimizu 1999 and is explicitly present in Gaṅgeśa's discussion of *arthāpatti* in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. I discussed the topic with Stephen Phillips during the workshop on *arthāpatti* organised in Singapore by Malcolm Keating (August 2018).

³¹Yoshimizu 2000a explains how Kumārila innovated with regard to Śabara's and Jaimini's concept of *apūrva*. AND CLOONEY? CHECK

3.4 Distinct terminology for arthāpatti

Since Kumārila is adamant in distinguishing arthāpatti and inference, he and his commentators need to avoid the terminology employed in the case of the latter and to devise new ways to refer to the constituent elements of arthāpatti. In most cases, this amounts to the fact that Kumārila and his commentators use more **generic** terms than the ones used in the context of inference. For instance, they speak of the absence from home as a *gamaka* ‘element causing one to understand’ (in the following ‘trigger’), instead of calling it a *hetu* ‘inferential reason’, of the being outside as a *gamya* ‘thing to be understood’ instead of a *sādhya*, and of the concomitance of absence from home and presence outside as a *sāhitya* ‘co-occurrence’ instead of *avinābhāva* ‘invariable concomitance’. The term *sambandha* ‘connection’ appears also to be used covering both cases.

By contrast, some terms acquire a **technical** meaning in the context of arthāpatti and are so strongly characterised as connected to it that they can be used as synonyms of the very term *arthāpatti*. The foremost among them is *anyathānupapatti* ‘impossibility otherwise’, of two cognitions, such as Caitra’s being alive and his being out of home, which is the real trigger of arthāpatti. Similarly, *kalpanā* ‘postulation’ defines the cognitive process which cannot be called inferential and out of which one reaches the conclusion that, e.g., “Caitra is outside”. Although *kalpanā* may have a negative connotation in other contexts, here it refers to the productive aspect of arthāpatti which leads one to a new conclusion, while at the same time preserving the same level of certainty.

4 arthāpatti in Prabhākara

Prabhākara’s commentary (called *Bṛhatī*, henceforth Bṛ) on the relevant passage of the ŚBh is relatively short and focuses on three elements:

1. distinct features of arthāpatti
2. arthāpatti as distinct from inference
3. denial of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*

As with Kumārila (see above, section 3.2), the points 1 and 2 are deeply connected. Prabhākara is also aware of the objection from the side of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (or from the Dīnnāga-Dharmakīrti school) concerning the identity of inference and arthāpatti.

On top of that, further (*ekadeśin-*)objectors, possibly from a Bhāṭṭa or proto-Bhāṭṭa standpoint, propose two other theories of arthāpatti, which are both refuted:³²

³²One could also consider the second theory as just a clarification of the first one.

1. Arthāpatti is due to the impossibility otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*), which consists in the fact that a thing X is not possible without another thing Y.
2. Arthāpatti is as defined above, but it is distinct from inference because the latter presupposes that one knows the connection (*sambandha*) between trigger and thing to be known.

The first theory is just sketched, but seems to be tantamount to Kumārila's one insofar as it is based on the clash of cognitions due to *anyathānupapatti*. It is refuted, since it is said to define nothing but an inference of the cause on the basis of its effect. In fact, as Śālikanātha explains in his commentary, also smoke is impossible without fire, so that this definition does not uniquely distinguish arthāpatti.

The second position is also akin to Kumārila's and states that the difference lies in the fact that in the case of inference one needs to know the relation beforehand (cf. YD, p. 73, and see above, section 2.2). This position will be refuted insofar as if one did not know of any connection, no impossibility (*anyathānupapatti*) would be grasped.

Prabhākara's final position will be connected to this refutation, but with the nuance that in the case of arthāpatti one knows a connection in general and not the specific one needed. He calls the connection one needs for arthāpatti *sambandhamātrajñāna* 'the cognition of a connection in general' and the one one does not need *jñātasambandhitā* 'the fact of having a connected element already known'.

According to Śālikanātha's commentary on the Br, called *Ṛjuvimalā*, this means that one only needs to know about the correlation between being alive and being in one place, not the one between not being home and being outside, so that the connection with the specific trigger of the arthāpatti (the absence from home) is not known. Why would Prabhākara not say, like Kumārila, that a relation is not needed at all in the case of arthāpatti? Because he is convinced that one needs some background information in order for the impossibility to be perceived. One might add that a very simple person, a child or an alien, would not perceive any inconsistency at seeing someone's absence from home (after all, the missing person could have become invisible or disappeared from this dimension etc.). One needs to be aware of the general connection between being alive and being somewhere in the world in order to grasp that there is something out of place if someone who is alive is not in her usual place or even just that something cannot take place without something else (as in Prabhākara's theory of *anyathānupapatti*, see below).

Having ruled out the two proposals by the *ekadeśins*, what can be the distinct specificity of arthāpatti? Prabhākara's formalisation of inference is possibly less strict than Kumārila's, insofar as Kumārila has been in this respect deeply influenced by Diñnāga's theory of the *trairūpya* (see section 3). Since Prabhākara's formulation of inference is less strictly formalised, the main reason for the distinction between arthāpatti and inference cannot rely —like in Kumārila— on technical aspects about the formalisation of *pakṣa* 'locus' and *hetu* 'inferential reason'. Moreover, Śālikanātha even explicitly states that also in the case of inference there is an impossibility otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*) at stake, since the smoke would not be possible without the fire.

In contrast, Prabhākara distinguishes arthāpatti from inference since in the former the thing which would not be possible is exactly the thing to be known. In the case of inference, it is the *hetu* (smoke) which would be impossible without the *sādhya* (fire), whereas in the case of arthāpatti, by contrast, it is the thing to be known (*gamya*) which would not be possible without its trigger.

Prabhākara adds in this connection an etymological explanation of arthāpatti, highlighting the identity of *gamya* and *anupapanna* elements:

anyathānupapadyamānatām āpādayann arthāntaram gamayati.

It causes one to know a different thing by causing [it] to attain the condition of not being possible otherwise. (Rāmanātha Śāstrī and Subrahmanya Sastri 1934–1967, p. 113)

This possibly means that he analysed the compound arthāpatti as ‘the fact of causing to attain a thing’. Śālikanātha will then elaborate further and add a different understanding of *artha* in the compound (see below, section 5.3.1).

4.1 Identification of the *gamya* of arthāpatti

Having said that according to Prabhākara the difference between arthāpatti and inference lies in the fact that in the latter it is the *gamya* which would not make sense without its trigger, what exactly is this *gamya*? The first solution examined is that it must be the ‘not being in another place’ (*anyatrābhāva*), which cannot make sense once one has seen Caitra’s absence from home. The not being elsewhere would in fact clash with the fact of not being present at home. Not being outside does indeed clash with not being home, so that it could make sense to call it an *anupapatti* ‘logical impossibility’, since it cannot be the case that one is not at home while not being elsewhere.

However, the non presence elsewhere would not go, because Prabhākara has already postulated that the thing which does not make sense needs to be the *gamya*, in order to distinguish arthāpatti from inference, and what one knows out of the mentioned example is the fact that Caitra is outside, and not that he is not outside. The argumentation moves therefore to (a) further candidate(s) in the short and somehow enigmatic conclusion of the discussion:

kasya tarhi. bhāvasya, na cāsau gṛhābhāvadarśanenopapadyate. bādham nopapadyate. na hi gṛhābhāvadarśanena vinā bahiḥ bhāva upapadyate.

What is then [the *gamya*]? The existence. And this does not make sense since one has seen the absence [of Caitra] from home.

Surely it does not make sense! For, it is not the case that the existence outside makes sense without the experience of the absence from home.

The first line seems to say that existence (*bhāva*) does not make sense once one has seen the absence from home. And the context suggests that after the proposal of *anyatrābhāva*, now a different proposal for something *anupapanna* is made. The problem here is that the next line seems to state the opposite, namely that *bhāva*, now better specified as *bahir bhāva* does not make sense *without* the absence from home. What should one make of this? I am inclined to think that the latter suggestion is to be taken as Prabhākara’s conclusive view, since it closes the paragraph. Prabhākara would then have

moved from the idea of *anyatrābhāva* to that of *bhāva* in general and finally to *bahirbhāva* as the *gamyā* which is *anupapanna*. The position about the *bhāva* in general (possibly to be identified, as in Śālikanātha, with the ‘being alive’) being *anupapanna* could be attributed to an opponent.³³

If this interpretation is correct, Prabhākara identifies the *gamyā* to be, rather, the ‘presence outside’ (*bahirbhāva*). As will be shown below, Śālikanātha will identify a flaw within this argument.

In which sense can one now say that there is an *anyathānupapatti*? Prabhākara explains *anyathānupapatti* as *anena vinā na upapadyate* “it does not take place without it” and goes on specifying that without having seen Caitra’s absence from home, one would not come to the conclusion that he is outside.³⁴

Given that Prabhākara has given up the requirement of a logical inconsistency, it is very much likely that his arthāpatti will not be deductive, like Kumārila’s. But what can lead from one state of affairs to another, only loosely connected to the first, if not a deduction? What happens, according to Prabhākara, is that one rephrases in a new way the loose connection so as to become aware of a new conclusion. In other words, a light form of belief revision is at stake in his arthāpatti. Belief revisions never start with one’s most strongly held beliefs, but rather with one’s weaker ones. In this case, there is no negation of a previous belief, but rather its update in reference to the case at stake. Why would one update the loose connection instead of giving up other beliefs (e.g., distrusting one’s sense perception of the empty house or one’s knowledge of Caitra’s being alive)? Because the update has the least epistemic consequences, insofar as it does not force one to give up any other belief.³⁵

³³Alternatively, one might suggest that the first line of Prabhākara’s passage simply misses a long *a* and should be read as *gṛhābhāvādarśanena*.

³⁴The whole passage reads: *asyānena vinā sadbhāvo nopapadyate* “The real existence of this does not take place without that”. The passage is attributed to an objector, but the interpretation of *anyathānupapatti* is not refuted (rather, the missing distinction from *anumāna* is). Śālikanātha glossing on the same passage writes: ***nopapadyate*** *ity anenāpi nāstītvam* “Even through the clause ‘it does not make sense’ [Prabhākara indicates] that it does not exist”.

³⁵“Even if all sentences in a belief set are accepted or considered as facts (so that they are assigned maximal probability), this does not mean that all sentences are of equal value for planning or problem-solving purposes. Certain pieces of our knowledge and beliefs about the world are more important than others when planning future actions, conducting scientific investigations, or reasoning in general. We will say that some sentences in a belief system have a higher degree of *epistemic entrenchment* than others. This degree of entrenchment will, intuitively, have a bearing on what is abandoned from a belief set, and

In formal terms, and assuming that being home is A, being outside is B and being alive is C:

Step 1. () (*sambandhamātrajñāna*: being alive is being somewhere, either home or not)

Step 2. [C]

Step 3. (belief revision: in Step 1. is tantamount to)

Note that Prabhākara does not spell out that one needs to be aware of the fact that Caitra is alive in Step 2 (hence my use of square brackets), he appears to imagine it as self assumed. That this is the case is confirmed by the fact that otherwise the knowledge that Caitra is outside could not be reached. In fact, if one puts () (as in the revision of the Step 1 belief in Step 3), in a truth table, the sheer fact of not being home could lead to either being outside as true or being outside as false. In the latter case, the falsity of not-being outside and the truth of not-being at home would imply the falsity of the antecedent (i.e., being alive) (which would make the implication true). Thus, the only way to come to the conclusion Prabhākara asserts is to assume C in Step 2. As will be discussed below, Śālikanātha will examine the risk of falsifying the antecedent. Prabhākara, instead, does not even hint at this possibility, so that I think we can safely assume that he, like Kumārila, considered the absence from home to go together with the fact of being alive. Prabhākara most likely does not spell this out for the same reasons why Kumārila did not feel he needed to explain the reasons for our knowledge that C is the case. The doubt about the premise, though present in the early history of Mīmāṃsā (see above, section 1.2) was most probably a minority position by the time of Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara, so that no much energy was needed to rule out this option. By contrast, after Śālikanātha's reaffirmation of this position, later Mīmāṃsakas will feel the need to spell out why they are so sure about Caitra's being alive (their typical explanation, as found, e.g., in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, will be that one has checked Caitra's astrological table and knows that he will live a long life).

The above reconstruction implies also that *anyathānupapatti* has in Prabhākara a well different meaning than in Kumārila. For Kumārila, it represented a clash between two cognitive data, possibly to be understood as a logical inconsistency (see Yoshimizu forthcoming). For Prabhākara, it seems to represent just the impossibility of something

what is retained when a contraction or a revision is carried out. [...] [W]hen a belief set K is revised or contracted, the sentences in K that are given up are those having the lowest degree of epistemic entrenchment. Fagin, Ullman and Vardi (1983), pp. 358 ff., introduce the notion of "database priorities" (Gärdenfors 1992, p. 17, emphasis original).

I came to the idea of belief revision in the case of Prabhākara's theory of arthāpatti during a long discussion on the topic with Malcolm C. Keating and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu (Tsukuba, March 2018). I am grateful to Kees van Berkel for helping me with my first steps in this logic and to Malcolm Keating for pointing out Gärdenfors 1992.

without something else, i.e., a precondition. In this sense, *na upapadyate* ends up being a synonym of *na sambhavati*, both in the sense of ‘is not possible’ as well as ‘does not take place’. Accordingly, he constantly glosses *anyathā* as *vinā*.

The next two tables sum up (in Sanskrit and English respectively) the main differences between Kumārila’s and Prabhākara’s understanding of arthāpatti. More details on the Prabhākara position can be read in section 5.3.

	gamaka	gamyā	anupapanna
K	jīvato gṛhābhāvadarśana	bahirbhāva	jīvato gṛhābhāva
P	(jīvato) gṛhābhāvadarśana	bahirbhāva	gamyā

	trigger	thing to be known	non-sensical element
K	not-being-home & alive	being out	not-being-home & alive
P	not-being-home (& alive)	being out	thing to be known

Thus, the *anupapanna* element is the existence outside, not in the sense that it is logically inconsistent with the experience of Caitra’s not being home, but rather insofar as the cognition of being outside would not have taken place without the experience of Caitra’s not being home.

The identification of the otherwise impossible element with the *gamyā*, however, leads to a hermeneutical problem, since Śabara had stated the following:

arthāpattir api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho ’nyathā nopapadyate ity arthakalpanā.

Which could be straightforwardly interpreted as:

As for arthāpatti, a seen or heard thing does not make sense otherwise, hence there is the postulation of a thing.³⁶

³⁶Since, as discussed above, arthāpatti always links two things, arthakalpanā could here mean ‘postulation of [another] thing’ (postulation of the *gamyā*) or ‘postulation on the basis of the [inconsistent] thing’ (postulation on the basis of the *gamaka*).

This seems to imply that once something does not make sense, one postulates something else. Hence, it seems to support Kumārila’s identification of the impossible element with the *gamaka* rather than with the *gamya*. Prabhākara must find a solution and reads, therefore, the passage by Śābara as follows:

As for arthāpatti, a seen or heard thing [when] the ensuing cognition does not make sense, is the postulation of the thing.

That is, he connects *dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vā* directly with *ity arthakalpanā* and adds an unspoken *pramiti* to be connected with *anyathā nopapadyate*. The proposal is inventive, since it manages to force Śābara’s text in a direction quite far from its most natural interpretation, and it can hardly be thought to be Śābara’s original intention.

4.2 Rejection of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*

Last, Prabhākara concludes the discussion with the explanation that Śābara’s wording does not mean that there is a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*, because the expectation of incomplete sentences is appeased by meanings, not words. An objector then asks why would have Śābara used both words, given that *dr̥ṣṭa* ‘experienced’ would have been enough. The reply is that it is just another expression. Śālikanātha will explain in his commentary thereon that “we are worldly people” and that therefore it does not make sense to discuss worldly linguistic usages.

The striking element here is that Prabhākara’s discussion is short and essential. Prabhākara’s main concern is to explain why Śābara mentioned a *śrutaḥ arthaḥ* but he does not attack Kumārila’s arguments in favour of a *śrutārthāpatti*. Why so? Possibly because Prabhākara thought that he was just mentioning the standard traditional approach to arthāpatti, so that he did not need to explain much. This could be confirmed by the fact that, by contrast, Kumārila addressed a Prabhākara-like objection, so that one can assume that it was Kumārila who was innovating here.

5 Śālikanātha: distinction from inference because of doubt

The following sections deal with the part on arthāpatti within Śālikanātha’s *Rjuvimalā* commentary on Prabhākara’s *Bṛhatī* (in turn commenting on the short quote by the Vṛttikāra on arthāpatti embedded in the ŚBh), and with the chapter on arthāpatti in Śālikanātha’s *Pramāṇaparāyaṇa* of the so-called *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (henceforth PrP). The PrP is a collection of essays on various topics which already soon after Prabhākara became the standard reference work for the Prabhākara philosophy.³⁷ Śālikanātha is in fact a

³⁷The PrP was most probably put together after the composition of its constituent books, but this does not change anything in the case of the book on epistemology.

clearer and more systematic writer than Prabhākara, so that most authors attacking Prabhākara positions indeed attacked Śālikanātha rather than Prabhākara directly.

As will be explained, both texts by Śālikanātha discuss all the main issues about arthāpatti, namely:

1. How is arthāpatti distinguished from inference?
2. How does arthāpatti work?
3. Is there a *śrutārthāpatti* distinguished from the normal arthāpatti?

Like in the case of Kumārila and Prabhākara, the first two issues will be dealt with jointly, since they are deeply intertwined. I will then discuss in detail the third one. Since Śālikanātha is one of the earliest authors dealing with the topic of arthāpatti after Kumārila, I will pay special attention to a comparison between the two.

5.1 Śālikanātha's indebtedness to Kumārila

Śālikanātha appears to have been heavily influenced by Kumārila approach to the topic. **First** of all, he starts the discussion by stating his own position, which overtly differs from Kumārila's. However, as a **second** step, he introduces a Naiyāyika objector who seems to directly react to Kumārila's attacks, insofar as he tries to construe the arthāpatti as a valid inference and especially focuses on the possibility of identifying a locus. Now, this seems at first sight difficult, because inferences depend on the fact that the probans and the probandum co-occur in the same locus, but the being outside of Caitra and his being home have necessarily two spatially distinct substrates. Therefore, the Naiyāyika proposes two alternative loci, namely the same time in which both occur and the same person in relation to which they occur. As an example of the first kind of co-occurrence he can quote the case of high tide and the raise of the moon, which are clearly causally linked not because they occur in the same place, but because they occur at the same time. The **third** and **fourth** steps consist, as with Kumārila, in Śālikanātha's refutation of these suggestions. Apart from adding a new reason, namely that the probans would be doubtful and this is impossible in an inference, Śālikanātha also repeats an argument found in Kumārila, namely that a possible probans, the sheer absence from home, would lead to excessive consequences (namely, the being outside also of people who do not exist at all), whereas another one (the absence from home of someone who is alive) would only work if it were made redundant (ŚV arthāpatti v. 25).

To elaborate: the Naiyāyika objector suggests to use the absence from home of Caitra as probans as soon as the moment of doubt has been overcome. But the upholder of the concluding view explains that the doubt is overcome exactly through arthāpatti, so that after that moment nothing is left to be inferred. In this sense, the argument is akin to Kumārila's one about the fact that a valid inference could in fact take place only after the seeming impossibility has been cleared out through arthāpatti —and would therefore be useless (see ŚV arthāpatti v. 24, and especially Pārthasārathi's commentary thereon).

Then, as a **fifth** step, Śālikanātha, just like Kumārila before him, examines the different elements needed for inference and arthāpatti. The distinctions between the

detailed analysis of these elements in Kumāriḷa and its much less deep discussion in Śālikaṇātha is discussed in section 5.3.

5.2 Śālikaṇātha on *anyathānupapatti*

In arthāpatti an element causes another element (see section 4.1 on how these are differently identified) to be impossible unless one postulates a third element, namely Caitra's being out. Kumāriḷa's and Prabhākara's schools discuss at length about the identification of the first two elements, whereas they remain relatively silent concerning the third one and the nature of the impossibility (see also above, section 4.1).³⁸

The impossibility appears to be twofold, in the sense that it is based on a material impossibility (how comes that our old friend Caitra, who is always home and did not die, is not there?) but is explicitly said by Prabhākara and by Śālikaṇātha (not in the PrP but in the *Rjuvimalā*) to be something the subject needs to be aware of. In other words, an ontological impossibility itself is not enough, one rather needs to be in the epistemological condition of being aware of what looks like an impossibility. This will then be appeased through the postulation of, for instance, Caitra's being out of home.

Summing up, for Kumāriḷa *anyathānupapatti* is a logical inconsistency.³⁹ Prabhākara differs slightly, since he interprets the *anyathānupapatti* as the impossibility of something without something else, i.e., as expressing merely a precondition, with no need of a cognitive or logical clash (see 4.1). By contrast, for Śālikaṇātha the *anyathānupapatti* appears to be a factual impossibility of which one needs to be aware. In short:

Kumāriḷa	Prabhākara	Śālikaṇātha
logical inconsistency	impossibility without	factual impossibility one is aware about

³⁸I also discussed the topic from the point of view of Śālikaṇātha here: <http://elisafreschi.com/2019/03/05/against-arthapatti-as-only-technically-distinguished-from-inference-in-salikanatha/>

³⁹The logical nature of the impossibility has been shown in Yoshimizu forthcoming.

5.3 How is arthāpatti conceptualised?

Śālikanātha's understanding of arthāpatti shares some elements with Kumārila's, but also diverges significantly from it. What they share is:

- arthāpatti is a separate instrument of knowledge, different than inference
- In arthāpatti there is a clash between a background knowledge and a newly acquired one (in the standard example: between one's knowing that Caitra is alive and one's seeing that he is not home)

The first point is a concern shared by all Mīmāṃsakas and hotly debated, mainly against Naiyāyika opponents. By contrast, Mīmāṃsakas diverge as for:

1. what is the trigger (and the thing known) in the process of arthāpatti
2. the interpretation of *anyathānupapatti*
3. the role of doubt
4. the reasons why arthāpatti is not an inference

Concerning point 1 (see also the table in section 4.1), the trigger is for Kumārila the absence from home of Caitra specified by the fact that he is alive. By contrast, the trigger for Śālikanātha (see below, and Subrahmanya Sastri 1961, pp. 274t he) is the sheer absence from home. How can this be? An opponent embedded in Śālikanātha's text can easily object that if the sheer absence from home were the trigger of the cognition of a person's being outside, then it would lead one to conclude that also a dead person X or an unborn person Y, who are also absent from home, are somewhere outside. Śālikanātha can explain away this objection through point No. 2. In fact, for Kumārila the clash between cognitions is given in the very moment you enter Caitra's home and see he is not there. Since these cognitions could not be possible otherwise, one postulates that Caitra is (alive and) outside. For Śālikanātha, by contrast, one reaches the awareness of an impossibility through the experienced trigger only. In other words, Caitra's absence from home makes his being alive look impossible and the trigger is such exactly insofar as it leads one to think that something one thought to know seems impossible. Accordingly, Caitra's absence from home is a trigger of the cognition of his being outside because it leads one to think that what one knew about Caitra, namely his being alive, is impossible. By contrast, the absence from home of X (a dead person) or Y (an unborn one) does not have the same effect, since it does not lead to any impossibility. According to Śālikanātha, this impossibility makes one doubt for a moment about Caitra's being alive ("How can he be alive, given that he is not home?", Subrahmanya Sastri 1961, p. 273). Next, one postulates something (such as Caitra's being outside) which appeases the doubt and the seeming impossibility and harmonises again all one's cognitions.

Thus, Śālikanātha deeply innovates on Prabhākara not just concerning the role of doubt, but also concerning the identification of what does not make sense and what is the *gama*, which is no longer the being outside, but the being (alive and outside). Why? Possibly because he was convinced of a logical flaw of Prabhākara's argument. In the *Rjuvimalā* he explains, in fact, that the existence outside in itself is not impossible. This

means that he is again reading *anyathānupapatti* as involving a (factual or logical) impossibility and not just as the fact that a given cognition does not take place (as in Prabhākara). In contrast to Prabhākara’s proposal, having seen a person’s absence from home it is very much (logically or factually) possible that she is outside. Nor can the being outside in itself, i.e. independently of the experience of her absence from home, be said to be (logically or factually) impossible. By contrast, the only thing which may look logically or factually impossible once one has experienced someone’s absence from home is her being still alive. Śālikanātha can nonetheless keep the identity between *gamyā* and *anupapanna* element, thus remaining faithful to a crucial point in Prabhākara’s account of arthāpatti. Śālikanātha can keep this identity insofar as both the *gamyā* and the *anupapanna* element (see the table below) are defined as just *bhāva* ‘existence’. In the case of the *gamyā*, this existence is further to be understood as the existence connected with an external place (i.e., *bahirdeśasambaddhabhāva*). By contrast, in the case of the definition of the *anupapanna* element, ‘existence’ should be understood as a synonym of ‘being alive’.

In this connection it is also worth mentioning that, although Śālikanātha clearly knew Kumārila, unlike Kumārila he did not enter into the detailed discussion of the elements of the inference and how they are missing in the case of arthāpatti. In fact, whereas Kumārila explained at length how one cannot construe a valid locus and probans on the basis of the elements at hand in the standard example of arthāpatti, Śālikanātha chiefly deals with the identification of the trigger alone. Why so? Possibly for reasons similar to the ones discussed in the case of Prabhākara. Kumārila accepted Diñnāga’s formal definition of inference as entailing a locus, a probans and a probandum, as well as a similar and dissimilar instances (see section 3), whereas Śālikanātha defines (perhaps less technically) inference as a cognition of the other correlate due to the experience of one correlate for one who knows their invariable concomitance.⁴⁰

Nonetheless, Śālikanātha probably considered that Prabhākara’s defence of arthāpatti as a distinct instrument of knowledge was weakened by the flaw discussed above, but also by his loose theory of inference. In fact, Prabhākara’s theory of inference is still pre-Diñnāga, whereas Kumārila and then Śālikanātha could not ignore the new bases for inference laid down by Diñnāga and, at least in the case of Śālikanātha, Dharmakīrti (his knowledge of the *trairūpya* distinction is evident in the *Rjuvimalā*, where the summary verses refer to the concept of *vipakṣa* ‘dissimilar instance’).

Consequently, the distinction of a *sambandhamātrajñāna* vs. *jñātasambandhitā* (about which see section 4 above) would no longer be enough as the basis of a distinct instrument of knowledge, since the distinction depended on an imprecise definition of the connection at stake. Kumārila’s solution would not be viable either since Śālikanātha shares Prabhākara’s idea that in order for one to perceive an impossibility she must have some

⁴⁰Cf. *jñātasambandhanīyamasyaikadeśasya darśanāt | ekadeśāntare buddhir anumānam abādhitē ||*, PrP, *pramāṇaparāyaṇa*, anumāna v. 1 (1961 p. 196)

expectation of what should have been the normal case, so that some (though vague) connection must be known beforehand.

Therefore, unlike Kumārila (who mostly focused on technical reasons distinguishing arthāpatti and inference and on the absence of prior knowledge of the relation) and Prabhākara (who focused only on the absence of a specific prior knowledge and on the impossibility pertaining to the *gamyā* not to the *gamaka*), Śālikanātha chose to add *doubt* as the distinct element of arthāpatti. He thus had a direct and easy way to distinguish arthāpatti and inference, but one that risked to jeopardise the epistemic status of arthāpatti as an instrument of necessarily *valid* cognition.

In other words, one comes to visit Caitra expecting him to be home and sees that he is not there. At this point, one's belief about his being alive is endangered, but one does not want to give it up. Immediately, one comes to the right solution: He is alive, but elsewhere. In logical terms, one could say that starting with the situation

(A) *being alive (being home being outside)

one risks a belief revision (as explained in section 4.1, "being alive" could be false), but does not really perform it, since the two conflicting beliefs are not on the same level, and there is a metarule stating that the first one should not be given up, so that one automatically opts for the second solution (Caitra is outside). However, this reconstruction has the disadvantage that it transgresses the requirement of Prabhākara that the *gamyā* and the *anupapanna* element are the same thing. More precisely, the unity of *gamyā* and *anupapanna* can be maintained only by cheating a little bit and making them the same although one of the two (the *anupapanna*) is the existence alive and the other (the *gamyā*) is the existence outside.

In order to keep a real unity, one can, by contrast, suggest the following reconstruction. One starts with the *sambandhamātrajñāna* that whoever is alive must be somewhere, but misconstrues it as being a bidirectional relation linking being alive (C) and being home (A) (whenever there is A there is C and vice versa). One then notices that A is not the case, something which would necessarily lead to the negation of C, if the bidirectional link were the case. However, one knows C to be the case, therefore one reconsiders the other seemingly conflicting belief, namely one's initial belief, the *sambandhamātrajñāna*.⁴¹ In this way, one understands it as entailing not the bidirectional link, but a simple material implication, linking A and C. In a material implication, the antecedent is not negated if the consequent is negated (affirming that by negating the antecedent you negate the consequent is the fallacy of denying the antecedent). Similarly, smoke and fire are linked by a material implication and in fact if there is no smoke, there can still be fire (e.g., in the case of melting gold). Once one has rephrased one's initial belief

⁴¹Readers will notice that also in this case, the belief revision proceeds according to a parsimony principle, see fn. 35.

in this way, one can discover that given the absence of A, the persistence of C needs to be the persistence of C understood in a slightly different way, i.e., as C devoid of A. It is still *bhāva* ‘existence’, but it is existence outside of one’s home, i.e., it is *bahirbhāva*.

(B) Step 1: being alive being somewhere (*sambandhajñānamātra*)

Step 2: (misattribution)

Step 3:

Step 4: ((())) (*anupapatti*)

Step 5: (belief revision: new construction of *sambandhajñānamātra*)

Step 6:

This reconstruction makes clear also why the risk of doubt is not enough, as Śālikanātha explains, to make the arthāpatti-delivered cognition unsure. In fact, C only *risks* to be put into doubt, but in fact one knows it surely to be the case and therefore moves immediately to the revision of another, weaker belief.

This partial innovation concerning the *gamya* and the *anupapanna* elements leads Śālikanātha to force the interpretation of a terse statement by Prabhākara. He reads a statement as part of an objector and re-reads another one with a somehow forced syntax (just like Prabhākara had done with Śābara). In the following quote, first comes Prabhākara’s text and its straightforward translation, then Śālikanātha’s interpretation as explained in the *Rjuvimalā*:

kasya tarhi. bhāvasya, na cāsau gṛhābhāvadarśanenopapadyate. bādham nopapadyate. na hi gṛhābhāvadarśanena vinā bahiḥ bhāva upapadyate.

P: What is then [the *gamya*]? The existence. In fact, this does not make sense once one has seen the absence from home. It surely does not make sense, for, without the experience of the absence from home the existence outside does not make sense.⁴²

Ś: What is then [the *gamya*]? [Obj.:] It is the existence [outside]. In fact, this does not make sense once one has seen the absence from home (so, the *gamya* would be the existence outside). [(Alleged) reply by Prabhākara:] Surely not. This (existence outside) does make sense. For, once one has experienced the absence from home, it is the existence, without the outside, which does not make sense (thus, the *gamya* is the sheer existence).

The following two tables sum up the key elements of arthāpatti in the authors examined:

	gamaka	gamya	anupapanna element

⁴²Note that Prabhākara reads *anyathā* in *anyathānupapatti* as *vinā* ‘without’. Also Śālikanātha comments *anyathāśabdena vināśabdārtha evocyate* “With the word *anyathā* ‘without’ only is meant” (Subrahmaniya Sastri 1967, p. 112). For various proposals concerning the meaning of this passage in Prabhākara, see section 4.1.

K	jīvato gṛhābhāvadarśana	bahirbhāva	jīvato gṛhābhāva
P	gṛhābhāvadarśana	bahirbhāva	gamyā
Ś	gṛhābhāvadarśana	(bahirdeśe) bhāva	(jīvana=)bhāva

	sambandha	anupapatti	lakṣaṇa of arthāpatti
K	existent, but not known	logical inconsistency	no sambandha no pakṣadharmatā no univ. quantification
P	sambandhamātrajñāna	not taking place	gamyasyānupapatti sambandhamātrajñāna
Ś	sambandhamātrajñāna	factual impossibility of which one is aware	gamyasyānupapatti sambandhamātrajñāna sandeha

The following table summarises the innovations by Śālikanātha:

	distinction from inference	gamyā	anupapanna element
K	ajñātasambandha	bahirbhāva	jīvato gṛhābhāva
P	gamyasyānupapatti	bahirbhāva	bahirbhāva
Ś	sandeha	(bahirdeśe) bhāva	(jīvana=)bhāva

5.3.1 A second Prābhākara way of understanding arthāpatti

The above interpretation is adversed by some unidentified opponents within the PrP, who claim that the real trigger of the process is not the absence from home, but the well-known

fact of Caitra's being alive. Caitra's being alive itself makes one doubt about it and then postulate something else (namely, its being connected with a new location, outside of home), in order to appease the doubt. Why this different interpretation? The reason is not spelt out in full, but Śālikanātha does say that this position depends on perception (*darśana*). This might mean that it does not depend on something unseen, like an absence. In this sense, these opponents might want to avoid the idea of having absence from home as the trigger of the process, because they want to avoid absences in general as playing any role, since, according to the Prābhākara epistemology, absences are nothing but the existence of something else. Accordingly, these opponents try to say that the being alive is then thrown into doubt by the fact that one experiences it in a new form (*rūpa*), namely, in connection with a different location. The text summarises this and the previous position in two verses (Subrahmanya Sastri 1961, p. 275), which also attempt an etymological explanation of arthāpatti, analysed respectively as the 'falling [into doubt] because of a state of affairs' or as the 'falling [into doubt] of a state of affairs'. The two positions are then also evoked succinctly at the end of the general discussion (Subrahmanya Sastri 1961, p. 278), where the active and passive understanding of 'falling [into doubt]' are also highlighted: in one case, the stress is on the trigger, insofar as it causes something else to fall into doubt, in the other it is on the trigger, insofar as it is itself the thing which is fallen into doubt. Thus, the thing which falls into doubt (the being alive) is the same in both cases, and the differences are partly lexical and partly more fundamental:

1. The thing fallen into doubt, e.g., Caitra's being alive, is fallen into doubt because of his absence from home (Śālikanātha) or because of its being in a different modality (opponents within the Prābhākara group).
2. The trigger of the postulation, which then appeases the seeming inconsistency, is in one case the thing which causes the doubt (Śālikanātha) and in the other the thing fallen into doubt (Prābhākara opponents).

Therefore, there are many similarities between the two explanations and Śālikanātha seems more than keen on playing down the differences, by neglecting the first one and explaining that the second one is not important. In his summary (as found at the end of the general discussion, Subrahmanya Sastri 1961, p. 278), both interpretations see a same thing, namely the absence from home, putting in doubt the same other thing, namely the fact that Caitra is alive. A contemporary reader may, however, note that these objectors negate the main characteristic of arthāpatti according to Prābhākara, namely the fact that it is the *gamyā* and not the *gamaka* which is *anupapanna*.

5.3.2 Śālikanātha's summary verses

Like Kumārila in the TV and Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Śālikanātha writes mostly in prose, but then adds some verses summarising his position. These verses are not explicitly attributed and summarise distinctly Śālikanātha's original contribution, so that one can safely attribute them to Śālikanātha himself.

The initial verse in Śālikanātha's presentation in the PrP describes the arthāpatti as a postulation triggered by a seen thing (e.g., Caitra's absence from home) which leads an unseen thing (Caitra's being alive) to a state of logical impossibility unless something else (Caitra's being outside) is postulated.

Further two verses indicate the end of a section and the beginning of a new one in the arthāpatti section of the PrP. Within the *Rjuvimalā* commentary on arthāpatti, Śālikanātha mentions seven verses which condense his contribution, at the end of the general discussion and before entering into the refutation of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*.

The summary verses in the *Rjuvimalā* are also a way for Śālikanātha to condense what he considered to be his contribution to the teaching on arthāpatti. This is described as being threefold: 1. Arthāpatti is established to be a distinct instrument of knowledge, 2. It is distinct due to the role of doubt, 3. Both arthāpatti and inference can be construed as a link between a *gamaka* ‘trigger’ and a *gamyā* ‘triggered’ (the thing to be known), but in the case of inference it is the *gamaka* (for instance, smoke) which does not make sense without the *gamyā*, whereas in the case of arthāpatti it is the *gamyā* itself which would not make sense otherwise.

6 How does the story continue?

The discussions on arthāpatti show how different authors supporting it share hardly more than the label and the fact that arthāpatti is a method of reasoning connecting premises with conclusions but different than inference.

This state of affairs is very much present in the early history of arthāpatti, ranging from the Tarkaśāstra (pre-Dignāga) as reconstructed by Giuseppe Tucci to Vātsyāyana (see Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter 1991 and section 1.2). This article cannot accommodate the successive developments of the debate, but I would like to anticipate that later authors continue to diverge in their approaches to arthāpatti. As a rapid survey, **Vācaspati** (10th c.) in his Nyāya work (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*) seems to have been the first one to introduce the topic of *virodha* ‘conflict’ among cognitions as the standard interpretation of *anyathānupapatti*. Vācaspati is also apparently the first author referring to Śālikanātha’s position as just implying doubt, although he does not discuss it separately from the Bhāṭṭa version. This then became the standard way Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa authors attacked the Prābhākara position. **Cidānanda**, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā who lived in the early 14th c., rephrases the *virodha* as a conflict between a general and a specific cognition. This idea has been then popularised by Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa in his 17th c. *Mānameyodaya*, which became a standard textbook of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

Śāntarakṣita (8th c.), in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* representation of Kumārila’s view, adds that one knows that Caitra is alive because of linguistic communication (*śabda*) (TS 1644). This might mean that the mention of *śabda* was already present in Kumārila’s *Bṛhāṭṭikā*. **Gaṅgeśa** (14th c.), possibly following some previous thinker(s), seems to have been the first one to develop rationalisations for the cogniser’s reasons to believe that Caitra should be home and that he is alive, namely the general habit of old people to stay home and astrological charts about the length of his life. Gaṅgeśa also attacked the idea of doubt as a foundation of arthāpatti, and made clear that a purpose of arthāpatti is the establishment of *apūrva*. Kumārila does indeed use arthāpatti to establish *apūrva*, but he does not address the problem within the arthāpatti section.

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (16th c.), a genial commentator on Gaṅgeśa, explained how arthāpatti, according to the own standards of Nyāya, should be a separate instrument of knowledge (see Nilanjan Das (forthcoming) in Keating).

As for supplying parts of a missing statement, called by Kumārila *śrutārthāpatti*, it also took a path which led it further away from *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* after Kumārila's attempt to bring them together as two cases of arthāpatti. After Jayanta's mention of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) in connection with *śrutārthāpatti*, which is followed by Sucarita's emphasis on it (about which, see Freschi forthcoming), *śrutārthāpatti* becomes part of a discussion having important bearings on philosophy of language, and focusing especially on the case of ellipsis.

7 Conclusions

Arthāpatti is an interesting case study for the intersections of distinct currents already within early Mīmāṃsā. On the one hand, one notices a hermeneutic concern, which probably constitutes the historical reason for the development of arthāpatti according to the hypothesis by Lars Göhler (Göhler 2011). On the other, the epistemological concern is well delineated at an early stage and becomes pre-eminent in the work of Kumārila.

The case of arthāpatti also shows how the two thinkers later credited with the creation of the two subschools of Mīmāṃsā, namely Kumārila and Prabhākara, at times ignored each other completely. In the case of Kumārila, his neglect of Prabhākara's position might be a sign of the fact that there were no important predecessors for the latter's distinctive positions on arthāpatti (especially for the identification of the nonsensical element with the thing to be known). In the case of Prabhākara, he attacks Kumārila's position in the case of the definition of arthāpatti in general, which could be a further evidence of the fact that Prabhākara was innovating and needed to persuade his audience of his new interpretations. By contrast, in the case of *śrutārthāpatti* Prabhākara does not refer at all to Kumārila's positions, perhaps because here Prabhākara was just grasping back to what he considered to be the mainstream position of Mīmāṃsā.

Besides, the discussions on arthāpatti show how different Mīmāṃsā authors presupposed and implemented different approaches, corresponding to what contemporary readers could identify as different logical theories, ranging from natural deduction and first order logic (Kumārila)⁴³ to belief revision logic (Prabhākara and Śālikanātha). The exact formalisation behind each of such approaches as conceived by Mīmāṃsā authors themselves will probably never be settled. Nonetheless, attempting to reconstruct and formalise them can help us in making sense of the own words of the various authors at

⁴³For a fuller discussion of natural deduction and first order logic in Kumārila, see Yoshimizu forthcoming.

stake and of the seeming paradoxes they entail (e.g., as for the identity of the *gamyā* and the *anupapanna* element in Śālikanātha).

Abbreviations

Bṛ Bṛhatī by Prabhākara, see Rāmanātha Śāstrī and Subrahmanya Sastri 1934–1967
PMS Mīmāṃsā Sūtra by Jaimini, see Apte (Āpaṭe) 1929
PrP Prakaraṇapañcikā by Śālikanātha Miśra, see Subrahmanya Sastri 1961
S´Bh S´a-barābhā-s ya by S´abara, see Apte (Āpat e) 1929
TV Tantravaṛttika by Kumaṛila, see Apte (Āpat e) 1929
YD Yuktidīpikā, see Wezler and Motegi 1998

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